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The United States, as other nation-states, claims 
legitimacy as an agency for the expression of the 
aspirations of its people. This political structure 
appeared as part of a historical process that implied a 
transfer of authority from ruling elite(s) to the public. 
However, U.S. foreign policy discourse evidences an 
incomplete relocation of authority. In matters of 
sovereignty and national interests, the policy establishment 
considers itself more capable of decisions than ordinary 
people. The establishment tends to view citizens as masses 
disinterested in and incapable of understanding vital 
decisions of the state. The policy establishment assumes 
the public's role is best limited to a general endorsement 
of expert opinion. 
This study proposes a model for the analysis of U.S. 
foreign policy discourse to explain how popular opinion is 
constructed in that arena. 'Synnationalistic discourse' is 
used to name this rhetorical genre. This term is used 
because of a tendency of the discourse to produce mass 
confidence in and acceptance of foreign policy items as 
these are discursively situated in the nation state vision. 
VI 
This model of discourse analysis is used to discover 
how popular support was gained by the Reagan Administration 
for a particularly controversial agenda item, the Strategic 
Defense Initiative. This study suggests the Administration 
used synnationalistic discourse to recontextualize the 
Strategic Defense Initiative as the American mission. The 
result was that S.D.I, became a commanding persuasive 
symbol, a rhetorical icon, within the sphere of popular 
opinion. 
The benefits of this model are two-fold. Because the 
model proposed by this study does not presume rational 
standards embraced by the classical tradition, it should be 
more useful for the analysis of U.S. foreign policy 
discourse. Second, the model may have a restorative 
function, showing how the discourse subverts the rhetorical 
tradition by being an instrument for hegemonic control. By 
showing how this speech is constructed, it may suggest a 





American foreign policy must operate within the 
parameters of popular opinion. Governmental and non-
governmental actors, therefore, have to secure the broadest 
range of support for their agenda items. This study 
proposes a model for analyzing discourse that the foreign 
policy establishment uses to achieve that objective. 
This chapter lays the groundwork for the study of 
American foreign policy discourse. The question that the 
study addresses is outlined in the first section. The 
second section examines the nature of American popular 
opinion, which will lead to a discussion of two rhetorical 
works contributing to the model proposed in this study. The 
third section suggests the justifications for this 
undertaking. In the fourth section, materials used for this 
study and the method of analysis are discussed. 
I 
Statement of the Problem 
Two problems exist for the U.S. foreign policy 
establishment as it attempts to gain popular approval for 
its items. First, while the foreign policy establishment 
seems immersed in discussion about strategy and tactics, its 
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central terms and foundational policies are seldom reviewed. 
Second, citizens, apart from university based elites and 
certain high profile members of the press, are presumed to 
be uninformed and apathetic and more interested in private 
pursuits rather than the international workings of their 
nat ion-state. 
This study attempts to answer the following question: 
Why is this arena of discourse closed? By answering this 
question, the study may assist individuals to become active 
participants in the American foreign policy process and to 
view examination of the loci communes of policy rhetoric as 
necessary and proper. 
Given the present monopoly by experts, this study 
argues that traditional models of discourse analysis are 
inadequate. Most of them are based on a nineteenth century 
image of an idealized America: an informed electorate 
applying rational analysis to extended discourse. At 
present, foreign policy discourse envisions a mass public 
that does not possess essential background knowledge and 
will not invest the time to acquire such information. 
Despite its image of a passive public, the discourse is 
crafted to delimit debate and, in some cases, to promote 
secrecy. Accordingly, foreign policy discourse does not 
lend itself to the analysis of logic, evidence, and 
cognition mandated by traditional rational models. 
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This study proposes a model for the analysis of U.S. 
foreign policy discourse that is not rationally based. This 
model is predicated on mass confidence in and acceptance of 
the nation-state vision. First, this study argues that 
policy advocates construct popular opinion for their agenda 
items by drawing from a reservoir of collective thought that 
forms the American vision. This vision presents the United 
States as the paradigm and exemplar of an emerging world 
society. 
Second, this study uses the term 'synnationalistic 
discourse,' to name the genre of rhetoric that is employed 
in the agenda-setting process of American foreign policy. 
By using this rhetoric, foreign policy advocates legitimize 
particular agenda items by situating them in the American 
vision. The rhetoric functions to recontextualize policies 
within the central terms of the national state. Thus their 
enactment is placed beyond criticism as being necessary for 
the survival and fruition of the United States. Items 
become functions of a larger international American mission. 
Particular agenda items, operating as rhetorical icons, take 
on the power of Foucault's central terms: nation, people, 
God, state, destiny, father and center. 
Further, this study argues that synnationalistic 
linkage makes rhetorical icons effective in molding popular 
opinion. These links work to produce collective commitment, 
serving to construct popular opinion. 
II 
Contributory Studies 
Underlying any rhetorical approach to the study of 
American foreign policy is the recognition that governments 
must depend on popular consensus in order to operate the 
nation-state domestically and internationally. Henry 
Kissinger observes that twentieth century governments are 
the "culmination of a process started by the French 
Revolution: the basing of governmental legitimacy on 
popular support."1 Kissinger asserts that, "Even 
totalitarian regimes are aberrations of a democratic 
legitimacy: they depend on popular consensus even when they 
manufacture it through propaganda and pressure." 
Public opinion, as an influential component in the U.S. 
foreign policy process, is problematic. The political 
establishment holds the assumption that the people are 
incapable of participating in the process due to lack of 
concern.6 Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder observe that 
the majority of Americans demonstrate limited interest and 
are reluctant to participate in matters of public affairs! 
The conclusion derived from a review of data concerning 
public political apathy over a twenty-four year period 
<1960-84) seemingly supports this claim: 
CFDor almost a quarter of a century, and almost 
regardless of changes in political seasons and/or 
questionnaire construction, the typical American 
has maintained a lukewarm involvement in public 
affairs. Indeed, in light of the great changes 
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that characterized American political life between 
the election of John F. Kennedy and the re-
election of Ronald Reagan, this constancy in over-
all levels of citizen political interest is truly 
remarkable.* 
The public's apathetic tendency is also reflected in a 
public opinion survey and analysis sponsored by the Chicago 
Council on Foreign Relations.3 The findings reveal that in 
the area where citizens "probably" have their greatest 
impact on public policy, national elections, participation 
is low.4 For instance, from the years 1975 to 1979, 69*/, of 
the public claimed to have voted in a presidential election. 
While this figure might suggest the majority of the populace 
voted, the editor contends that this figure "overstates" the 
actual turnout. Likewise, 63V. of the respondents reported 
that they voted in a local or state election; £7'/, to have 
asked someone to vote for their party or candidate; 23V. to 
have written or spoken to a public official about some 
political issue; 22V. to have gone to a political meeting to 
hear a candidate speak; and mv, to have worked for a 
political party or candidate.7 
Several reasons for the causes of apathy have been 
advanced. First, Harry Holloway and John George attribute 
the public's political detachment to a conflict within the 
psyche of the American individual of private versus public 
concerns.8 Holloway and George argue that the apolitical 
behavior of much of the population is the result of the 
individual being concerned with his/her well-being and 
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personal advancement. These concerns include employment, 
health and prospects for their children. Political 
involvement—actual participation and gaining information 
concerning political issues—is viewed in terms of cost and 
benefits. Political activity is often viewed as unnecessary 
or even "counterproductive."9 Time spent in politics is an 
interference to time "that might be otherwise devoted to 
work or personal life and leisure."10 Holloway and George 
contend that these attitudes lead to "privatism, 
. . . a self-centered individualism which tends to 
distinguish the personal from the social or public sector of 
national life."11 
A second cause for apathy may be the 'distance' and 
abstractness of many foreign policy concerns. The 
citizenry is thought to be little concerned about U.S. 
foreign policy because, as Thomas Graham observes, it is 
"more remote from most people's lives" than public policy.16 
Citizens' lack of concern has been documented by the Chicago 
Council on Foreign Relations. During the period of the 
study, only four percent of the general public surveyed 
contacted public officials about a foreign policy issue. 
Even more important, a declining interest was registered for 
information relating to international issues." 
Policy makers' acceptance of the general population's 
lack of relevant foreign policy information is a major 
problem for the survival of a healthy civic culture. The 
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decision makers assume citizens do not possess the 
information to form rational judgments in matters of foreign 
policy and thus do not invite their participation in public 
dialogue. The position taken by policy formulators is 
comparable to the one suggested by Jacque Ellul that 
government "cannot follow opinion; opinion must follow the 
government."1* On the other hand, a 'manufactured' 
legitimacy does not reflect a genuine loyalty or commitment 
to our public institutions. 
While decision makers minimize the role of the public 
in the states's international operations, they also are 
cognizant of the public's potential. McGeorge Bundy asserts 
that U.S. policy formulators accept that "for many 
Americans, foreign policy doesn't really matter, except when 
it does."'3 The result is what Ellul states to be the 
greatest danger facing the foreign policy establishment— 
"public opinion manifesting itself in the shape of crisis" 
and overturning previous decisions.16 This damburst is the 
result of a public denied access to decision making; it can 
only enter the process in a catastrophic way. 
This public 'threat' manifests in its ability to deny 
elected policy formulators with the loss of legitimacy. 
'Legitimacy' is defined here as the belief of the people 
that individuals responsible for proposing and implementing 
policy, both domestic and foreign, are operating in their 
perceived interests.17 Legitimacy is granted in the United 
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States when a majority of voters demonstrate through the 
electorial process that the 'best' leaders or 
representatives have been selected. 
Elected individuals by the public demonstration have 
valid affirmations of what Max Weber calls "charisma" or 
special abilities "not accessible to everybody" to carry out 
a mission—in this case, policy formulation and/or 
implementation.'8 Authority is maintained until such time 
that tenure duly expires or when officials no longer prove 
themselves to be the best persons for the position—"the 
master sent by the gods."" The latter occurs when the 
officials fail to communicate to the people that they are 
operating in the interests of the state. "It is then that 
his mission is extinguished, and hope waits and searches for 
a new holder of charisma."20 
Breakdowns of legitimacy have been serious in the 
foreign policy arena. The defeat of Jimmy Carter in 1980 is 
primarily attributed to the Administration's rhetorical 
failure.61 The Administration failed to convince a 
questioning public that its handling of the Iranian Crisis 
was correct. In Congress, adverse public reaction 
registered over the Panama Canal Treaties in 1976. Members 
backing the treaties were accused of 'giving away' the 
canal. An inadequate response to that charge is credited in 
part for the defeat of half the senators who supported the 
treaties and who were up for re-election in 1978.eB 
9 
Even the fear that legitimacy is crumbling can result in 
elected individuals surrendering their entire political 
agendas. Lyndon Johnson's decision not to seek re-election 
exemplifies a surrender due to the inability of the 
Administration's discourse to convince the public of the 
legitimacy of its actions in Vietnam. 
The switch of legitimacy from one elected official to 
another threatens the agendas of the predecessor with 
reversal or abandonment. Therefore, advocates of particular 
foreign policy objectives are faced with a paradox. They 
believe the mass populace is uninformed. But concurrently, 
they accept that the populace has the potential to "converge 
on one point . . . to become excited and assert" itself—to 
become a public—producing 'undesired' changes and risking 
the continuity of foreign policy agendas.Ea 
To mollify this potential, policy advocates construct 
popular opinion favorable for their propositions. The 
discursive construction of popular opinion has been an area 
of continuous inquiry. In his sixteenth century political 
treatise, Machiavelli advised that leaders should depend on 
image to lead the masses since knowledge was not possible 
for the general populace.8* The application of the 
Machiavellian philosophy was discernable in the use of 
'cant' in the conduct of internal and international 
relations prior to the twentieth century. Grant Hugo 
defines 'cant' much as modern political speakers define 
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'code,' an "esoteric language intended to confuse the vulgar 
while conveying a specific meaning to initiates."" 
The basing of government on popular support during the 
twentieth century has mandated that the citizens possess a 
"relatively stable set of predispositions that are 
manifested in the form of emotive attachments and 
sentimental identifications with the symbols of the 
political system."86 While 'deliberate deception' may not 
be a necessary characteristic of today's political 
discourse, Murray Edelman observes it functions as a 
"systematic though unplanned dissemination of illusion" 
which creates meaning "not based upon observation or 
empirical evidence. "E? 
The ambiguity and complexity of international issues 
are provided meaning by interfacing the citizens' extant 
beliefs and attitudes with current international issues—by 
identifying the unknown with the known. The interface 
occurs because the language of political advocates perform 
as 'cuings' for the general public. Citizens, in turn, 
construct meaning from their collective past.68 
Philip Wander offers important insights about 
argumentative modes of political discourse and how they 
function in defining American foreign policy.89 Wander 
suggests that foreign policy discourse takes two forms: 
"prophetic dualism" and "technocratic realism." First, 
prophetic dualism is a Manichean dualism of good versus 
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evil. It resonates with the world view of Christian 
Fundamentalism. Prophetic dualism is a non-comprising 
argumentative form which "divides the world into two 
camps."30 
The second mode, technocratic realism places efficiency 
over morality. The tone is more "secular, humanistic, 
scientific, and negotiable."31 According to Wander, this is 
the argument of the expert—the "pragmatic government 
bureaucrats and skilled professionals."36 
Prophetic dualism is suggested by Wander to be 
rhetorically effective for an audience which abides by a 
"religious faith, the faith of our fathers, the ideals of 
freedom, individuality, a militant God, and the existence of 
evil in the world."33 On the other hand, technocratic 
realism promotes the view of a "managerial humanist 
elite."3* This form is commanding rhetorically to labor, 
racial and ethnic minorities, middle-class professionals, 
and the intelligentsia."35 
Wander observes that since one form may have stronger 
appeal than another depending on the constituency, one mode 
can predominate over the other during different periods. 
For instance, Wander argues that prophetic dualism was used 
by the Eisenhowei—Dulles Administration to attract the 
"Protestant Establishment" which dominated the Republican 
Party during the nineteen-f if ties.36 When the American 
people became "scornful of an America shaped along lines 
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laid down by a Republican God and Protestant 
Fundamentalists," policy advocates turned to the 
argumentative mode of technocratic realism."7 The 
rhetorical change was made to attract the scholars, 
government bureaucrats, and skilled professionals "who 
formed part of the coalition which brought the Kennedy 
Administration into power. "aB 
Wander writes that these seemingly diametrically 
opposed modes of foreign policy discourse "can co-exist," 
and "elements of each may appear in the same speech" due to 
a "deeper level"—a ground:39 
Beneath isolated and abstracted form of argument 
and the demands of political pluralism is the 
realization that arguments over foreign policy 
share a world, literally "the world," so deep and 
fundamental as to be called the "ground on which 
foreign policy is debated in this country. It is 
ground shared by various administrations, 
Republican and Democrat.*0 
Wander argues this teleogical axiom of foreign policy 
discourse is nationalism. 
The "ideological context wherein this ground is defined 
and made to appear natural" is the persona of the United 
States.*1 The discourse of political advocates that 
personifies the United States cues popular perceptions of 
its supreme "mission in a world of nations" with a "moral 
and spiritual center raising it above all other nations" in 
the international community.*8 It is that collective 
perception which dictates that the "United States is the 
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manifestation of Truth, Justice, and Freedom placed on this 
earth by a God whose purpose it is to make of it an 
instrument for extending His spiritual and material 
blessings to the rest of humanity."** When interfaced 
successfully with the collective perception, foreign policy 
arguments become "pervasive," "obvious," and "free of 
challenge" for the populace.** 
Foreign policy discourse is viewed as secular speech 
with religious dimensions. Wander implies this religiosity 
in his description of the "United States" as ground for 
American foreign policy rhetoric: "Its personification as 
an Actor with . . . a moral and spiritual center."*8 This 
study suggests that foreign policy discourse produces a 
vision of the United States for the mass public that has 
religious rhetoricity. 
The persuasive effect on popular opinion is in keeping 
with that of traditional religion as assessed by Edward W. 
Said: furnishing the mass population "with systems of 
authority and with canons of order whose regular effect is 
either to compel subservience or to gain adherence."*6 
Thus, the study may suggest that the apathetic 
characteristic of American citizens is discourse related. 
This study builds from Wander's perspective. The model 
of foreign policy discourse proposed in this study attempts 
to show systematically how the interface occurs between 
foreign policy items and the collective confidence in the 
1<+ 
mission of the United States. The model incorporates and 
expands a framework of foreign policy that accounts for 
ideology and myth.*7 This study accepts the basic premise 
posited by Michael Calvin McGee that "Ch3uman beings in 
collectivity behave and think differently than human beings 
in isolation. . . . The collectivity is said to 'have a 
mind of its own' distinct from the individual qua 
individual . "*B 
Collective commitment in matters of foreign policy is 
identified in this study as synnationalism. This study 
argues that collective support is more extensive than 
nationalism. This tendency is constructed by 
recontextualizing agenda items as the American mission. The 
argument is made that when specific agenda items are joined 
by discourse with the mission, these become comparable to 
what McGee defines as an "ideograph, . . . a high-order 
abstraction representing collective commitment to a 
particular but equivocal and ill-defined normative goal.'"*9 
This study, following McGee'5 lead, argues that these 
abstractions operate at different levels. McGee suggests 
two ideographic tiers. One group functions internationally 
while the other performs domestically.50 This work contends 
the domestic ideographic strata is further divided in terms 
of foreign policy and partisan political applications. The 
rhetorical device in discourse primarily intended for a 
partisan effect serves to gather "subgroup" support for a 
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particular party." In foreign policy, citizens are 
"united" by synnationalistic recontextualizations "that 
represent the political entity 'United States.'"" 
To distinguish between the two, this study provides a 
different nomenclature than that offered by McGee. The term 
'ideograph' is used for partisan applications. When the 
device constructs popular opinion supporting foreign policy 
items, the term 'icon' is applied. This refinement of terms 
is used to avoid confusion. 
The integration of McGee's contributions with those of 
Wander should result in a more functional model for the 
understanding of American foreign policy discourse. This 
goal is in keeping with McGee's assertion that "structures 
must be understood and described before one can claim to 
have constructed a theoretically precise explanation of a 
society's ideology."53 Hopefully this research will move 
rhetoricians closer to that precision and continue the 
progression of knowledge concerning foreign policy discourse 
and its construction of popular opinion. The importance of 
such an undertaking is addressed in the following section. 
Ill 
Significance of Study 
The significance of the rhetorical model of U.S. 
foreign policy proposed in this study is its pluralistic 
perspective. This perspective attempts to combine and 
extend the strategic, metaphoric, and ideological approaches 
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that have been used to analyze American foreign policy 
discourse. While other scholars have analyzed foreign 
policy dicourse from these singular perspectives, this study 
suggests a holistic model to explain the construction of 
popular opinion in the foreign policy arena.8* Singularly, 
this provides justification as well as suggests the 
significance for the study. However, this construct's 
perspective makes the study meaningful for two other 
reasons. 
First, the model does not assume the rhetoricity of 
rational discourse for the construction of popular opinion, 
a position held by the more traditional models." From the 
classical perspective, citizens are conceived to be 
responsive to logical arguments and proofs as well as to 
emotional appeals. Furthermore, the traditional approach 
assumes that the populace will be actively attentive. 
Individuals will possess an educational background equipping 
them with a framework including a vocabulary that will 
enable them to comprehend and judge logical discourse. 
Constructing popular opinion does not lend itself to this 
classical tradition of deliberative discourse. The rational 
model's shortcomings are nowhere more apparent than in 
presidential debates. According to Jamieson and Birdsell, 
this discourse is a unique form of modern political 
communication and "has become the buzz word for 
'serious politics.'"5* 
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Not only do debates invite a focused attention 
uncharacteristic of ads but they also create a 
climate in which even those otherwise disposed to 
shun political messaging are expected to be able 
to converse about political data. . . . " 
In a campaign season chock full of spot ads 
and news snippets, viewers turn to debates to 
provide sustained analysis of issues and close 
comparisons of candidates.87 
One would expect that because of their atypicality 
presidential debates would command rationality. However, 
Jamieson and Birdsell lament this is not the case: 
Those who have been ill disposed to concentrate on 
politics are unlikely suddenly to devote all their 
energy to a ninety-minute learning experience. 
And even when motivation spikes attention, new 
vocabulary needs time to sink in. Definitions 
must be embedded. Time is required to get past 
surface meanings to substance.38 
So even in the context of the perceived politically 
notable event of presidential debates, the classical model 
of discourse has limited applications. Arguably, that model 
would even be less beneficial for determining how advocates 
construct favorable popular opinion for more obscure foreign 
policy. Because the model proposed by this study does not 
presume rational standards embraced by the classical 
tradition, it should be more expedient for the analysis of 
U.S. foreign policy discourse. 
A model that does not privilege rationality suggests a 
second justification for the study. The study may have a 
restorative function, showing how the discourse subverts the 
rhetorical tradition by being an instrument for hegemonic 
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control. By showing how this speech is constructed, it may 
suggest a site from which a citizen voice could enter the 
debate. 
Insights generated from the study may serve as a means 
of eventually restoring authentic legitimacy to the process 
of foreign policy. This form of 'legitimacy,' unlike the 
Weberian use of the term, would be as Jurgen Habermas argues 
"an accord or agreement among free and equals. "s* Instead 
of a structure of domination and acquiescence, it would be 
one of participation.40 The materials and method for 
achieving these objectives are presented in the following 
section. 
IV 
Materials and the Method of Inquiry 
A variety of materials were used to develop the model 
of discourse analysis. These materials included scholarly 
works primarily from communication, political science, and 
sociology. Principally, discourse broadcast by the 
television medium was used to operationalize the model. 
Artifacts were taken mainly from this medium, because it is 
the source "relied" upon by citizens to form their political 
views.61 Additional materials consisted of other speech 
texts, historical works, magazine and newspaper articles, 
and governmental and political documents. The latter served 
to exemplify certain points made by the study as well as to 
describe the situational context of the model. 
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Speech and interview transcriptions used in this study 
were carefully prepared from video and audio recordings. 
These were rechecked for accuracy. Whenever possible, 
written transcripts of the discourse appearing in another 
source or provided by the medium broadcasting the material 
were compared with the recorded broadcasts and the 
personally prepared transcripts to further ensure 
reliabi1ity. 
This study is arranged in the following format. 
Chapter Two proposes a model for the analysis of U.S. 
foreign policy discourse. The chapter answers the following 
questions. What part does the nation-state vision play in 
American foreign policy? Why does a foreign policy 
establishment continue to dominate decisions in U.S. 
international operations? How does this establishment use 
the vision in the construction of popular opinion? 
The model is operationalized in Chapter Three. Some of 
the questions addressed in this chapter are: 
What are the constraints facing foreign policy items? What 
means are available for advocates to address them? How did 
the Reagan Administration apply these means to redefine an 
event the citizens could have perceived as an Administration 
failure. How did the Strategic Defense Initiative become an 
icon in the process? 
Chapter Four concludes the study. The questions asked 
in this chapter are: Why does American foreign policy 
EO 
discourse harm the rhetorical and nation-state ideals? How 
might future research improve the applicability of this 
model of discourse analysis? What are the potential 
benefits of this study? 
Summary 
One of the more fundamental problems facing policy 
formulators in the American nation-state is the construction 
of popular opinion. American foreign policy is determined 
and put into place by a foreign policy establishment. Its 
actions must be approved by the mass citizenry. Advocates 
must convince its citizens that the proposed actions for the 
United States in the international community are correct. 
If unable to do so, they risk losing support for policy and 
with it the ability to rule. 
To show how these advocates cope with this potentially 
destabilizing situation, this study proposes a model of 
foreign policy discourse that does not assume rational 
discourse to be effective for the mass public. Instead, it 
suggests that the rhetoricity of foreign policy discourse is 
grounded in collective thought constructing the American 
vision. This model is presented in Chapter Two. 
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CHAPTER II 
A SYNNATIONALISTIC MODEL OF FOREIGN POLICY DISCOURSE 
The last chapter suggested that U.S. foreign policy 
discourse contained an inventional element that constrained 
public discussion of certain issues. This chapter will 
attempt to reconstruct salient features of the inventional 
process in order to understand why this is so. As the last 
chapter made plain, it is not enough to 'read' the message 
in the traditional sense. A kind of deconstruct ion must be 
employed in order to understand how the message arose and 
what bases of appeal were used in its construction. 
Accordingly, the chapter is divided into two parts: 
The first part of the chapter discusses the site of all 
foreign policy discourse: the nation-state. The second 
part discusses a significant feature of that discourse, 
the inventional process by which debatable politicies are 
placed in contexts in which debate is adjourned. This 
process is a kind of iconization. 
The site of policy discourse is the nation-state. 
Sites of discourse determine who can speak, what rules are 
applicable, what can be said on a subject. They are arenas 
of constraint and possibility, and those who control the 
site of discourse control the content, form, and extent 
S7 
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of public debate. In a large sense, the nation-state 
functions as a site, just as a courtroom, a public building, 
a convention, or a university does. Thus, a discussion of 
the nation-state—its origins, special history, and 
particular ethos—is relevant here. 
The nation-state claims legitimacy as an instrument for 
the expression of the aspirations of its people. It 
appeared as a historical successor to kingship, and it 
implied a progressive, internationally pervasive, transfer 
of authority from ruling elite(s) to the public. 
However, nation-states evidence an incomplete 
relocation of authority. Because of their transcendent 
identities extending back into history and forward into the 
future, in matters of sovereignty and national interests, 
foreign policy custodians consider themselves more capable 
of decisions than ordinary people whose horizons are bound 
by day to day affairs. Therefore, they tend to view 
citizens as masses incapable of understanding fundamental 
decisions of the state. This seems to be the case of U.S. 
foreign policy. The policy establishment assumes the 
public's role is best limited to a general endorsement of 
expert opinion. A participating public might interfere with 
the policy's efficacy. U.S. foreign policy discourse is 
articulated, therefore, to provide the illusion of citizen 
participation by constructing popular support. 
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In the second section, the model is described. This is 
a process of message construction in which policy objectives 
are linked to the centering terms of the national vision. 
Effective American foreign policy discourse is one that 
successfully recontextualizes items with this vision. The 
result is a mythic identity for the item. This 
recontextualization, a rhetorical icon, has synnationalistic 
tendencies that unify individuals and construct favorable 
popular opinion. In this light, metaphoric similarities 
seem to exist between the Christian icon and the rhetorical 
icon in the sense that both make use of abstract universal 
terms that bind individuals to ideas beyond their mortal 
existence and human limits. 
I 
The Nature of U.S. Foreign Policy 
The vesting of sovereignty in the nation-state and the 
importance of popular consent for the structure's 
international recognition represent a fundamental visionary 
shift of the system from that of its immediate political 
precursor, dynastic orders. This earlier political 
formation had gained prominence by the nineteenth century in 
"most of the important states in international politics."1 
The structure's political principle was the dynastic 
centralization of political authority. This principle 
affirmed that within their "defined territories," dynasts 
were the "only rule-making and rule-applying bodies."E The 
30 
location of authority was characteristic of the legal 
doctrine of sovereignty described by French political 
theorist, Jean Bodin in his 1576 work, De La Republique, 
that the ruler "cannot in anyway be subject to the commands 
of another, for it is he who makes the law for the subject, 
abrogates law already made, and amends absolute law."3 
Dynastic sovereignty was functional because of the 
existing vision. This vision was constructed from the 
"consensus of political values that prevailed in Europe, the 
cosmopolitanism of the upper classes, the regard for 
principles of royal authority and Christianity."* 
People still thought in terms of a hierarchy of 
social classes, each with its special rights, 
privileges, and obligations, rather than in terms 
of natural rights and natural laws that applied 
equally to all persons. Their loyalties were to 
their towns, provinces, and ruling dynasties 
rather than to nation-states or their fellow 
citizens,5 
The "age of egalitarian revolutions" beginning during 
the latter seventeenth century and continuing until the 
middle of the nineteenth century challenged this philosophic 
underpinning of dynastic sovereignty—the divine right of 
kings and principles of royal succession as well as the 
stability inherent within the system.6 The result was 
emerging visions for social advancements and change through 
competing political institutions. These ideas were 
incorporated from the Enlightenment and the economic revival 
of the eighteenth century: 
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. . . CTDhe growing belief that the mind of man 
was devoid of ideas at birth gave rise to the 
theory that all men were created equal and were 
capable of being molded by their environment. The 
hierarchical conception of society was 
discredited, and the idea that social and moral 
progress could be achieved by creating the proper 
environment gradually replaced the older desire 
for stability and order. At first, the proper 
environment was thought to be one in which 
everyone could exercise his natural rights and 
obey governmental regulations that were made in 
accordance with natural law. Gradually, the 
concept was expanded to include democracy and the 
right of each nationality to govern itself.' 
The period that has been termed a "middle-class 
revolutionary movement" and from which the French Revolution 
arose initiated the new visions and with it the gradual 
sovereign shift from dynasts to the mass public.8 The 
people became more active participants with the visions in 
that they shared their destinies with the state.9 The 
movement's effects on the mass public were the "development 
of strong emotional attachments to the central state (adding 
to the traditional loyalties to provinces or towns) and 
involvement of the average citizen or subject in his 
government's political life.'"0 These centering words— 
State, Citizen, Nation, People—became the sacred terms of a 
secular religion. 
The movement's visions produced a reformation of 
political structures extending from western society where 
the thought was ascendant to all areas of the globe." 
Instead of the government creating the state, in the last 
two centuries, the vision of social improvement 
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institutionalized by political environments and supported by 
popular opinion has "preceded, and in many cases created, 
the state. ",E This reformation is reflected in the fact 
that internal popular consent, real or manufactured, is 
considered a necessary condition for official modern nation-
state sovereignty. The status empowers the United States 
and other polities to join the international community as 
"legal persons" and provides for autonomy in their internal 
operations .,3 
Established nation-states confer the internationally 
recognized legal status in accordance with a state's 
capabilities for meeting certain preconditions. These 
provisions include the state's "stability of organization 
and administration," the "ability to regulate its internal 
affairs without outside interference or control," and 
"specific international capacities."1* 
Ultimately, internal popular consent is deemed 
instrumental in the satisfaction of these requirements. 
Without a consenting plurality, coerced or democratically 
induced, multiple factions might disrupt any potential for a 
state's operational continuity domestically or 
internationally. This perhaps would result in an 
opportunity for external interventions or subjugation. 
Since changes in the form of government or in the 
personnel who operate the government do not necessarily 
affect political stability, sovereignty, unlike the previous 
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political thought, resides in the nation-state itself and 
not in one person whether dictator, monarch, or elected 
official. The government, presiding either as a group or an 
individual, is granted transitory sovereign attributes when, 
and only as long as, it is recognized to have tenable 
authority based on the assent or acquiescence of its 
population empowering it to act.18 
The involvement of the citizenry in the operations of 
the nation-state allows for popular influence in what had 
been once the private domain of the dynasts. For instance, 
in foreign affairs, the "greater involvement of the average 
citizen or subject . . . imposes restrictions on the policy 
makers' freedom of action."16 An example is Quebec, where 
a provincial mobilization of voters has resulted in a 
partial withdrawal of support for the central government at 
Ottawa. 
While the latitude of government actions has been 
narrowed by popular influence, at the same time, the policy 
process of nation-states clearly shows that the decentering 
of authority is only partial. Autocratic structures, for 
example, contemplate public reaction and its ramifications, 
but authority comparable to the dynasts remains centralized. 
Ithiel De Sola Pool attested to this fact in a 1960 
description of how the Kremlin elites' handled the "force" 
of Soviet public opinion by "brutal suppression," and "by 
creating diversions and camouflage."17 
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The United States policy process because of and in 
spite of its representative arrangement and a vast 
commercial press also evidences a relative passivity and 
even disinterest of the people in decision making. This is 
so even though the U.S. structural and cultural orientations 
provide for potentially powerful popular participation:18 
Some form of pluralism is more plausible than 
the single elite model of power structure but it 
still leaves us with a most imperfect democracy. 
. . . Elites, whether political, corporate, 
professional, or whatever, have far more influence 
than the bulk of the population. For good or ill 
a relatively small number have much more to say 
about policy matters than the people at large. 
The results are at odds with the equality implied 
by classic democratic theory. To reject the 
single elite theory is not to ignore the 
substantial inequalities present." 
Domestic structures juxtaposed with the nature of 
states' policies may suggest why the foci of power are more 
centralized in some nation-states than in others. The 
overriding purpose for nation-state operations is survival 
of its vision.80 When domestic and foreign policies 
interlock for national security interests as in ideological 
or revolutionary regimes, popular participation may seem 
disruptive to the vision.81 For instance, in an 
ideological nation-state, doctrine provides the vision of 
the state.Be As long as the doctrinal vision remains 
operational, it motivates both domestic and foreign policy 
under its rubric. 
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Similarly, the warrant for the revolutionary nation-
state, the vision of self-determination, effectively 
combines both elements of policy.8* The revolutionary 
nation-state must secure for itself political and economic 
stability that may be impossible through domestic policies 
alone." Therefore, "foreign policy is domestic policy 
pursued by other means; it is domestic policy carried beyond 
the boundaries of the state."8* John Spanier addresses the 
importance of this association in his discussion of foreign 
policy benefits to governments of revolutionary nation-
states. He writes that in these states the "only way of 
arousing the people and keeping them united is to continue 
the struggle" against a perceived external threat." The 
governments "preserve their power by externalizing domestic 
dissatisfaction" by finding "foreign scapegoats . . . to 
relieve internal stresses and strains. "e8 
In both of these regimes, domestic and foreign policy 
are inseparable from the guiding state visions. They are 
united in ideological polities because the pervasive 
"analytical framework" makes them heuristically 
interdependent .e* While in revolutionary states, 
unification of policy is functionally vital30 
These domestic structures centralize authority and 
limit citizen participation. In the former, participation 
is not needed because "ideology is official, and its 
interpretation Cits implementation domestically and 
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internationally] is the task of the Party leaders, who 
regard their reading of the ideology as embodying the only 
true view of society and history; as 'true believers.'"31 
In the latter, a single leader or one party symbolizes the 
state vision of nation-building and use domestic and foreign 
policy concurrently as the means for its consummation.3E 
Citizen input in the policy process is suppressed because it 
imposes threats to the government's personification as the 
vision. 
State structures that allow for greater separation 
between policies and state vision enhance the opportunity 
for public participation, exhibiting a more decentralized 
location of authority. Such is the case of the United 
States. First, U.S. domestic and foreign policies are 
separated by different operating presumptions. Domestic 
policy is not guided by a singular vision and its 
protection. Its quintessence is a multiplicity of public 
interests.33 The policy may assume threats to the structure 
of the internal organization, but these are generally 
situational, perhaps brought about by failed policy or 
natural catastrophe. 
U.S. foreign policy, on the other hand, is directly 
linked to sovereignty and the state vision.3* Its 
supposition is maintenance of self-determination for the 
nation-state and from that the international advancement of 
its vision. The assumption exists that the state must 
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compete globally for the satisfaction of its interests 
against rational adversaries.33 These adversaries vie in 
the international arena for their own objectives which are 
perceived more often than not as mutually exclusive and 
frequently detrimental to U.S. interests. With security 
resulting from successful rivalry, the state is able to 
further its vision. 
Second, these distinctions produce different attitudes 
concerning citizen input in U.S. policy processes. Unless 
faced with a perceived catastrophic upheaval, domestic 
policy operates within the established structure for 
internal policy. The orientation is grounded within the 
advocacy tradition of a representative democracy. This 
allows for mediated citizen influence through prolonged 
debate. Morton A. Kaplan notes that "majorities should not 
work their will immediately but only after delay . . . . "36 
The "underlying consensus is that the majorities, if they 
can sustain themselves, ultimately should have their 
way . . . "37 
The domestic advocacy process allowing for citizen 
input is judged less suitable for foreign policy.39 The 
inclination of that policy establishment is to equate 
American foreign policy with the solution of immediate 
issues necessary for the success of the long-term vision.39 
Public participation through extended debate is deemed 
counterproductive in this atmosphere often characterized by 
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a sense of urgency resulting in a need for secrecy and 
"combative solidarity."*0 George H. Questor details these 
two postures inherent in U.S. policy processes: 
In the domestic sector, we do not find 
ourselves adopting the working assumption of 
having an adversary, a rational antagonist against 
whom we must close ranks. In the prevention of 
floods or epidemics, or the avoidance of 
unemployment, we do not steel ourselves to worry 
that "the enemy might be listening." 
One can think of relatively few issues on the 
domestic side which impose a continuing need for 
secrecy. Advance information on the next location 
of new highways or the timing of currency 
devaluations must be held closely, of course, but 
these are the exceptions, rather than the rule. 
By contrast, secrecy is almost the rule in foreign 
policy, with openness the exception, because the 
foreign ministry of another state might exploit 
our openness. But the secrecy is indeed merely 
the symptom of a broader form of institutionalized 
hostility toward foreign governments, and 
institutionalized expectations of loyalty among 
one's own citizens. While American Congressmen on 
domestic issues are urged to have split loyalties, 
taking their constituents' wishes and needs into 
account, but also paying attention to national 
needs, no such diversity of goals is advocated for 
the foreign policy practitioner. As a working 
myth, foreign service academies still use 
something like "my country above all" as their 
first approximation of a goal.*1 
The U.S. structural orientation and its juxtaposition 
with policy may explain the nature of its foreign policy 
discourse. On one hand, the U.S. structure promotes 
decentralized power. But the perceptual contrasts between 
purposes of policy makes decentralization, while not 
complete, more apparent and desired at the domestic rather 
than at the foreign policy level. U.S. foreign policy 
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discourse may have a similar objective for its citizens as 
the effects attempted by regimes whose structural 
orientations are less democratic and both domestic and 
foreign policies are joined. This objective would be the 
acquiescence of the majority of citizens. 
The objective may be similar because all nation-state 
policy formulators are faced with a comparable problem: How 
to join its people with the state in matters considered to 
be or presented as vital for the nation-state vision? This 
is the utmost challenge for advocates because of the myriad 
of nations as people—their "ethnicities" as well as 
interests—residing within the boundaries of the nation-
state—the "formal political organization which grants 
citizenship . "*e 
Without uniting the majority of its people behind its 
proposed actions, the advocates would have to compete with 
others for the position best enunciating and/or advancing a 
majority vision. While this might be structurally desirable 
in domestic policy of democratic societies such as the 
United States, internal competition would defeat the 
immediacy and secrecy perceived necessary for foreign 
policy. Advocacy in the policy process of autocratic 
regimes would or could be seen as a challenge to either the 
ideologies or the governments' symbolic role as the nation-
state. In any case, policy formulators in these structures 
might risk losing the prerogative to speak for the people. 
To gain mass support for their foreign policy agendas, 
advocates must construct effectively a perception within the 
majority of people, while their interests may be 
domestically diverse, that they share a common vision, a 
destiny, with the nation-state. Advocates, operating on the 
peoples' behalf, speaking with a single voice, protect and 
promote this destiny where it might be threatened. 
Arguably, policy formulators attempt to meet this 
demand by drawing from and/or recycling a reservoir of 
collective thought producing what Karl Deutsch addresses as 
a higher order of nationalism.*3 The term, synnationalism 
is used here to suggest such a cumulative nationalism that 
reflects more support than nationalism. Synnationalism 
would result in the nation-state as a "terminal community"— 
"the largest community that, when the chips are down, 
effectively commands men's loyalty, overriding the claims of 
both the lesser communities within it and those that cut 
across it within a still greater society."** 
Synnationalism is seemingly possible because of a 
metaphoric affinity of nation-state vision to religious 
vision. The correlation is suggested in Emile Durkheim's 
theoretical discussion of the religiosity of society.*5 The 
parallel occurs because both thoughts, religious and 
societal, share a "heterogeneity" that "characterizes the 
sacred from the profane"—the ideal vision and experienced 
real i ty .** 
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Society, which Durkheim argues is the source of all 
religious thought, participates in the real world and at the 
same time imports an "ideal."*7 Even though individuals 
cope with the imperfections of society, Durkheim contends 
that they strive and hope for a "perfect society, where 
justice and truth would be sovereign and from which evil in 
all its forms" is "banished forever."*6 Durkheim concludes 
that this thought "is in close relations with the religious 
sentiment. . . . CI3t is towards the realization of this 
that all religions strive."*' 
Durkheim posits that this analogous relationship of 
societal and religious vision provides the basis for a 
collective inventional framework.30 From Durkheim's 
perspective, the purposiveness of societal religiosity for 
individuals within the collective is that society's vision 
tends to be hermeneutically more authoritative for an 
individual than an interpretive framework she/he would have 
in isolation.s* This became the basis for the Durkheimian 
idea of society as transcendence, an entity that justified 
and sometimes encouraged individual sacrifice. Even the 
secular person retain a God: society. 
This position is in keeping with the "essential 
character of the religious spirit" as postulated by Alfred 
North Whitehead.se Society would supply the "vision of 
something which stands beyond, behind, and within, the 
passing flux of immediate things; something which is real, 
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and yet waiting to be realised; something which is a remote 
possibility, and yet the greatest of present facts; 
something that gives meaning to all that passes."" The 
effect would be an optimism enriching what otherwise might 
be a "basatelle of transient experience."3* This, Durkheim 
argues, has the potency to unite individuals into "one 
single moral community"—society." Durkheim found 
similarities between the secular organizations (Military) 
and religious organizations (Catholicism). Despite a wide 
difference in goals, tactics, and values, the organizations 
inspired an abstract and idealized mode of commitment. 
If Durkheim's thesis is correct, the nation-state 
vision, an agent of the largest and more pervasive unit of 
society, would be commanding due to its purport. This has 
been conceptualized as "the absolute solution to history and 
life"—a kind of immortality.56 For instance, Carlton J. 
H. Hayes makes the following observation that "CtDo national 
state as to Universal Church, is attributable a mission of 
salvation and an ideal of immortality. The nation is 
conceived of as eternal, and the deaths of its loyal sons 
only add to its undying glory."37 
This optimistic assurance arguably has the potential to 
elicit a similar response from members of nation-states as 
that of "human nature to religious vision,"—a "surrender to 
the claim for assimilation."38 For the individual, this 
would be a synnationalistic tendency, a submission to the 
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nation-state vision that when invoked overrides other 
factional loyalties. 
Plausibly, popular support for nation-state foreign 
policy can be explained in terms of advocates' abilities to 
effectively produce synnationalistic attachments for policy 
items. From this standpoint, policy formulators establish 
or maintain necessary mass support for their agenda by 
constructing a popular opinion that foreign policy items are 
fundamental and consonant with the nation-state vision. 
This is achieved in autocratic regimes through force or 
pressure because internal advocacy, for the most part, is 
structurally excluded. In such regimes, supportive mass 
opinion in the policy process ostensibly is little more than 
coerced acquiescence orchestrated by governmental 
mechanisms." 
U.S. policy formulators, as other nation-states with 
democratic structures must construct supporting opinion 
through rhetorical discourse. This discourse allows for but 
delimits debate by interfacing policy items with the nation-
state vision. The framework for a model to analyze this 
discourse is discussed in the next section. 
II 
A Rhetoric of Synnationalism 
To construct popular opinion, the U.S. foreign policy 
establishment frames its policy language and imagery that 
maximizes synnationalistic tendencies in its citizens. This 
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discourse resonates with the individuals' identity with the 
American vision. The majority of U.S. citizens assimilate 
their national identity through early socialization and day 
to day life in a environment rich with nationalistic 
messages. This usually is a cradle to grave discursive 
process, as Harold Lasswell asserts, beginning with 
citizenship, the "national rite of baptism," and continuing 
through social discourse, in which "the state solicitously 
follows him through life, tutoring him in a national 
catechism, teaching him by pious schooling and precept the 
beauties of national holiness.40 The icon is essentially 
epideictic rather than analytical. It functions as a 
reminder, a 'presentness' of the state in remote places. 
Lasswell argues that these interactions exist at all 
levels within the American system.61 They manifest in 
nation-state rituals as standing, hand-over-heart, while 
reciting the "Pledge of Allegiance" or singing the "Star 
Spangled Banner"; in myths of heroism told and retold in 
homes, schools, churches, and other social groups or 
dramatized by the media; in national celebrations, e.g., 
July 4th observances; and in physical artifacts such as 
coins and memorials that surround individuals in everyday 
life. 
Individuals collaborate with this discourse, resulting 
for many, in acceptance of and loyalty to the construct of 
the United States' vision. This construct presumes that the 
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environment institutionalized by the American system best 
serves the humanitarian interests domestically and 
internationally and, therefore, is superior to other 
systems. The vision exemplifies a Manicheanism predicated 
on a heterogeneity between the United States and other 
polities. The United States polity is the ideal. That 
ideal is correct—good and moral—while the non-ideal 
(polities outside the American sphere) is wrong—evil or 
immoral.66 The ideal functions as a sacred. 
As stated in the previous section, the construct is 
directly linked to foreign policy, whose accepted ends are 
its protection and promotion internationally leading to a 
more perfect world community. This goal, described as the 
"American mission," seeks to re-shape the world polities in 
the U.S. image.63 The thought embedded in the visional 
fabric is that if others could choose, the choice would be 
the American way; if people could experience the American 
system or a facsimile thereof, they would opt for that 
system. 
The vision has its resonance in discourse used to 
construct the American identity. Kissinger asserts, "A 
sense of mission is clearly a legacy of American history; to 
most Americans, America has always stood for something other 
than its own grandeur."** For instance, Thomas Jefferson 
stated in 1801, "A just and republican government maintained 
here will be a standing monument and example for the aim of 
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the people of other countries."43 Although Jefferson's 
example was an internal rather than a world mission, it 
continues to resonate in our foreign policy. The thought 
has been recycled by discourse throughout U.S. history as 
evidenced by President Carter's statement in 1977 that: "We 
are confident that democracy's example will be compelling, 
and so we seek to bring that example closer to those . . . 
who are not yet convinced about the advantages of our kind 
of life."" 
Arguably, a hermeneutic framework for U.S. foreign 
policy emerges from the collective ideas expressed by 
discourse that forms this vision. Individuals do not share 
one commonly held view of the American mission anymore than 
they do of 'liberty' or 'democracy.' But as Durkheim 
writes, "in incarnating themselves in individuals, 
collective ideas tend to individualize themselves. Each 
understands them after his own fashion and marks them with 
his own stamp; he suppresses certain elements and adds 
others."67 The American vision, as Hans Morgenthau argues 
of ideology, grows "out organically from the very conception 
Americans have formed of who they are and what they are all 
about in their relation with other nations."48 
Arguably, the conceptualization of the American vision 
is constructed from individually assimilated discourse, 
historic and recycled, that professes United States' 
international interests necessary for survival and fruition 
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of the U.S. nation-state. Although widespread, these 
interests can be delimited to three dimensions: defense, 
economic, and world order.6' First is defense or protection 
of American people, territory and institutions against any 
potential foreign dangers. Through discourse, the historic 
dicta are internalized that enemies "are real," and 
"external vigilance is the price of freedom."70 
The economic interest results from the interplay of 
individuals with the U.S. capitalist praxis. The sentiment 
embedded, though amorphous, presumes a common locus similar 
to that professed by Benjamin Franklin that "CiDndustry and 
constant employment are preservations of the morals and 
virtue of a nation."" The economic interest is juxtaposed 
to the vision because of the ideal that the U.S. economic 
system is necessary for the "social destination to take care 
of itself" that "allows the social universe to unfold . . . 
beyond human interference."76 
Finally, the world order interest takes the form of an 
American responsibility to all nations of the world. Henry 
Kissinger writes that this obligation "is part of American 
folklore that, while other nations have interests, we have 
responsibilities; while other nations are concerned with 
equilibrium, we are concerned with the legal requirements of 
peace."73 This area of interest dictates that American 
foreign policy should be directed for the establishment of a 
peaceful international environment in which disputes between 
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nations can be resolved without resort to war. The 
assumption exists that the natural order is one of peace. 
Problems produce conflict and war. If problems exist, 
"plans can be made for meeting them."7* 
These sentiments are continually born anew in the 
affirmations of particular individuals. For instance, the 
defense interest is recycled through discourse as when Jimmy 
Carter stated in his Farewell Address that: "National 
weakness, real or perceived, can tempt aggression and thus 
cause war. That's why the United States can never neglect 
its military strength. We must and we will remain 
strong."75 The interest was reaffirmed in Ronald Reagan's 
observation that: "We . . . live in a world that's torn by 
a great moral struggle—between democracy and its enemies, 
between the spirits of freedom and those who fear 
freedom."74 The economic interest is renewed through 
statements comparable to President Reagan's summons to 
"reawaken" the American "industrial giant" in order for the 
United States to be once again the "exemplar of freedom and 
a beacon of hope for those who do not now have freedom."77 
As with defense and economic interests, a distinctly 
American version of world order is constructed through 
discourse. John Kennedy affirmed this version in the 
following words: 
To that world assembly of sovereign states, the 
United Nations, our last hope in an age where the 
instruments of war have far outpaced the 
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instruments of peace, we renew our pledge of 
support—to prevent it from becoming merely a 
forum for invective—to strengthen its shield of 
the new and the weak—and to enlarge the area in 
which its writ may run.78 
The discourse expressing these interests is generated 
from hermeneutic bases for U.S. foreign policy, loci 
communes or shared perceptual commonalities. The importance 
of these archetypes is that they are traces of contexts that 
individuals have experienced by participating with societal 
discourse that bespeak the essentials of the United States 
vision. 
These archetypes, while they lie latent in the 
individual's subconscious, can be activated by fresh 
discourse, making interpretation possible." One way of 
understanding the process is in terms of Ogden and Richard's 
theory of signs: 
. . . when a context has affected us in the past, 
the recurrence of merely a part of the context 
will cause us to react in the way in which we 
reacted before. A sign is always a stimulus 
similar to some part of an original stimulus and 
sufficient to call up the engram formed by the 
stimulus.80 
The effect of calling up the archetype expands the 
contextual trace to a position of referent signified by the 
sign. 
The theory can be applied in the following situation. 
An American citizen is told that nonvalue-assigned Country 
'X' has adopted a socialistic government. In this instance, 
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the sign is 'socialism.' Archetypes exist with abstract 
emotional attachments to capitalism and opposition to 
socialism. The archetypes are the product of numerous 
accounts, richer contexts, of the virtues of the former and 
the abomination of the latter. Perhaps these have been told 
in stories of socialistic countries 'Y' and 'Z.' For 
example, the individual has been told how the peoples of 'Y' 
and 'Z' are automatons controlled by the state with little 
or no hope for their future. These thoughts are associated 
with the people of country 'X.' In the process, 'X' loses 
its value anonymity. 
While the theory of signs may demonstrate the 
importance of the archetype, it fails to show how 
synnationalistic attachments can be constructed for foreign 
policy items. A more accurate description that accounts for 
the unifying tendencies of foreign policy discourse 
seemingly would be one that attempts, as Michael Calvin 
McGee suggests, "to see a legitimate social reality in a 
vocabulary of complex high-order abstractions that refer to 
and invoke a sense of 'the people.'"81 The approach 
ostensibly would be one that provides for an expansion of a 
referential archetype to a level rhetorically effective for 
the majority of citizens. 
Mythology may indicate such an expansion. 'Mythology' 
is intended here, as Roland Barthes writes in his methodical 
description, as the "study of a type of speech. "BE This 
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type of speech, myth, Barthes asserts, is a language whose 
message constructs a reality by drawing from historic 
meaning.83 Barthes' approach for the analysis of this 
language is the study of "ideas-in-form"—"part both of 
semiology inasmuch as it is a formal science, and of 
ideology inasmuch as it is an historical science."8* 
According to Barthes, myth is a second order 
semiological system "constructed from a semiological chain 
which existed before it."85 The originating system similar 
to that discussed above consists of a signifier (an image), 
a signified (a concept), and a sign (the relationship 
between concept and image). 
This tripartite schema can be demonstrated using the 
previous example of country 'X.' The 'capitalism good-
socialism bad' archetype is an image existing suspended as a 
mental state. In suspension, the image exists as a 
preconceived attitude, a predisposition that readily 
attaches itself to an unknown substance when stimulated. 
The concept, the second term of the system, supplies the 
trigger in that it confronts the individual with country 
'X,' which lacks a contextual definition and results from 
the 'telling about' of that country to the individual. The 
'telling' process works in conjunction with secondary 
conditions, non-contextual thoughts of Country 'X' that 
existed prior to or derived from the process. The third 
term in the semiological chain, the sign, is the 
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relationship of signified to signifier being the 
"associative total" of the archetype and country 'X.'84 The 
sign ultimately is the contextualization of 'X' for the 
individual. 
The second order system, myth, begins with this product 
of the first system. But whereas sign is contextualization 
in the first order, at the mythic level, it becomes form. 
Form unites with concept resulting in recontextualization. 
The process, as described here, transforms meaning derived 
from the first semiological system that might be limited to 
the individual into a more pervasive universal, "an opinion 
molecule," that registers in the foreign policy process.87 
Myth according to Barthes is predicated on the second 
term of the system, the concept. Concept is what Barthes 
asserts to be the "motivation . . . which causes myth to be 
uttered."88 In foreign policy discourse, the concept of 
myth would be the assimilated expressions of United States' 
interests held by individuals—defense, economic, and world 
order. The concept in this discourse would not be the 
"purified essence" of one interest but would exist as a 
"formless, unstable, nebulous condensation"—the construct 
of the American vision.89 
The signifier, the form, would crystalize specific 
interests. For example, the economic interest is 
contextualized by the 'capitalism good-socialism bad' 
Country 'X.' The stories of 'Y' and 'Z,' embroiled in the 
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archetype of socialism, are personified in the existence of 
'X.' If 'Y' and 'Z' were blamed for previous wars, 'X' 
predictably would be seen as a potential threat not only to 
the U.S. nation-state but to a peaceful world climate. 
For the concept to function as a unifier of American 
interests, the verifiable record of the form by design would 
be exploited. Mythic form differs from the image of the 
first order semiological system in that the latter is 
archetypal. That image is non-entity-specific. Form of the 
second order can not exist comparably since it originates as 
the sign of the first system. In the orbit of meaning, both 
sign and its derivative embrace an archetypal charged 
entity. This entity is specified in that the emotional 
charge unites with an object and its material record. In 
the example of Country 'X,' meaning includes the archetype 
along with the country's geo-political and cultural 
histories. 
The peculiar system of myth, its ability to unite 
individual interests, demands manipulation of these 
qualities. If the form appears as a unique isolated symbol, 
the concept would be obscured. The economic interest as 
well as defense and world order become of no concern. 
Country 'X' may have had a past history of being ruled by 
dictators operating under the guise of capitalism. The 
populace perhaps had suffered seeing their nation's wealth, 
their potential, being robbed by a handful of elites. If 
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this were the case and had existed over decades, a citizens' 
revolt against those who had oppressed them to replace that 
rule with a more distributive economic system—socialism— 
might seem justifiable. 
With a potential for awareness of that record, the U.S. 
populace, while they might accept the 'capitalism good-
socialism bad' charged entity, perhaps would question or 
even deny a concept which no longer could be supported by 
the Country 'X' form. By drawing attention away from the 
record, the concept signified by the form, in this instance, 
'X,' is recontextualized and becomes more compelling. 
Recontextualization arguably is the defining feature of 
myth.90 The meaning of the form is only obscured, not 
destroyed. The "indisputable" image in Barthes words "is 
tamed, put at a distance, made almost transparent; it 
recedes a little, it becomes the accomplice of a concept 
which corner to it fully armed."91 Once subdued, the meaning 
serves as a "reserve" for the form which "must constantly 
be able to be rooted again in the meaning and to get there 
what nature it needs for its nutriment; above all it must be 
able to hide there.96 
With Barthes semiological explanation, the reason for 
the revolution in 'X' may be lost, but form taps into the 
atrocities of the revolt, violence and killings; into ties 
that might have existed between the deposed 'capitalists' 
and U.S. administrations and those that might exist now 
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between 'X' and other socialist countries. These bring a 
richness to the form of a government which is bent on 
destruction of fundamental human rights as well as a 
government which is against the U.S. society demonstrated by 
the harm it imposed on its former leadership, friends of the 
United States. These meanings are absorbed within the 
concept which replaces the distorted history with other 
si tuations. 
These situations are the "unlimited mass of signifiers" 
that are available to the concept." Countries 'Y' and 'Z,' 
although ingrained in the archetype of 'socialism,' stand 
alone or together as signifiers of the concept. Other 
revolutions, potential or actual, that are asserted to be 
socialist inspired become signifiers—forms—within the 
concept as well. Likewise, stories once learned during 
socialization, when recalled, add to the existing concept. 
The result of meaning which is at once specified— 
atrocities committed by socialist 'X'—and general— 
socialism inspires revolution as in 'X,1 'Y,' and ' Z ' — 
provides for the unification of the form with the conceptual 
motivation producing "myth itself"—recontextualization.'"' 
This occurs for two reasons. First, literal meaning is 
always present (the entity—socialist 'X') causing the 
concept (defense, economic, and world peace) to be 
established by an "eternal reference.'"3 Thus socialist 
'X,' although highlighted as a revolutionary society that 
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does harm to friends of the U.S., remains a physical polity 
indicating a need for the United States to be aware of its 
goals and to defend them. The inclination will remain as 
long as 'X' exists. If in the case the country alters its 
government to capitalism or is conquered, the polity's past 
will exist as a historical example supporting the national 
interests in perpetuity. 
Second, American interests, the motivation for the 
concept, are "frozen, purified, eternalized, made absent.96 
Form exists as if it "naturally conjured up the concept" of 
myth, "as if the signifier gave a foundation to the 
signified."97 To paraphrase Barthes: U.S. defense 
interests? It's just a fact: look at 'X' which is just 
like countries 'Y' and 'Z' who have threatened us in the 
past!98 The specific intention is lost, and the 
recontextualization takes on the quality of a mythic 
generality, a unification of political form with the 
American vision. 
If the preceding description is accurate, it may serve 
to explain why national myths historically as well as 
currently have been and are credited with creating and 
maintaining collective state belief, or consciousness. For 
instance, David Bidney writes that Neo-Platonic and Stoic 
philosophers of the Hellenistic period "saw in it [myth] a 
method of preserving the authority of tradition as well as 
religious prerogatives of the state."99 Gilbert Morris 
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Cuthbertson echoes Bidney's suggestion in his statement that 
"Myths evoke the shared emotions of nationalism. Myths 
. .". create social cohesion and stimulate the social 
consciousness of group politics."100 
The unifying effect of myth perhaps can be attributed 
to its commanding nature, which Barthes states "has an 
imperative, buttonholing character: 
stemming from an historical concept, directly 
springing from contingency . . , it is I whom it 
has come to seek. It is turned toward me, I am 
subjected to its intentional force, it summons me 
to receive its expansive ambiguity. . . . I feel 
as if I were personally receiving an imperious 
injunction. . . . This is because the concept 
appears to me in all its appropriative nature: it 
is a real call . . . .",01 
Lasswell seemingly attests to this feature in his 
observation that the "political myth which is accepted with 
such confidence, is a configuration of assumptions (either 
true or false) that they hardly appear to bear the character 
of assumption."102 
Besides functioning as a means of state support, mythic 
recontextualization suggestibly could provide a description 
of a United States' rhetoric of synnationalism and 
ultimately may provide a clearer understanding of the state 
vision. Murray Edelman notes that people in collectives 
have a propensity to "respond chiefly to symbols that 
oversimplify and distort."103 A political 
recontextualization operates as a symbol in that meaning is 
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attached to a referential unit. The recontextualization of 
the referent makes this symbol comparable to what is termed 
'key symbols' or 'condensation symbols."0'' No matter the 
terminology, a political recontextualization functions to 
unite the populace by promoting synnationalistic allegiance 
to that symbol as long as the specificity of meaning is not 
questioned.105 The rhetorically commanding effect of the 
item for the mass public as Lasswell states "is that of 
proviSding a common experience for everyone in the state": 
Indeed, one of the few experiences that bind human 
beings together, irrespective of race, region, 
occupation, party, or religion, is exposure to the 
same set of key words. Sentiments of loyalty 
cluster around these terms, and contribute to the 
unity of the commonwealth.104 
Because of this impact and in light of the argument 
that the United States vision shares similarities to 
religious vision, a political recontextualization perhaps 
could be explicated metaphorically. More specifically, 
foreign policy items with synnationalistic tendencies may 
have the essence of a secular political icon, a rhetorical 
icon, much like that of a religious icon of the Church. 
George Galavaris posits the existence of secular icons that 
personify the traditions of the state and have strong 
moralizing characteristics.107 Furthermore, Herbert Read, 
argues that icons, images projected through discourse, are 
instrumental for the "development of human consciousness, 
59 
and therefore in the development of the aptitudes and skills 
dependent on consciousness."108 These analogous attributes 
seemingly are present in political recontextualizations and 
in their synnationalistic tendencies. 
Aesthetic theory, while it is intended for and applies 
directly to visual artifacts such as the religious icon, 
may, as Edelman suggests, give insights into these 
"expressive political symbols" of recontextual izat ion.109 As 
Edelman states, both forms exist as a hermeneutic in which 
"CpDsychological distance from symbols that evoke perception 
and emotions heightens their potency rather than reducing it 
. . . bringCingD out in concentrated form those particular 
meanings and emotions which the members of a group create 
and reinforce in each other.110 
Aesthetic theory in general encompasses two 
psychological functions of art: vitalism and elevation. 
The former stresses what is important while the latter lifts 
art out of its "intentional purposiveness."M1 Art 
originates with vitalism. As an instrument of discourse, 
art has never attempted to portray the entirety of the world 
but only what is significant as a "life force."118 For 
instance, during the Paleolithic Period typified by nomadic 
tribes in which wild animals were important for survival, 
the art form registered as animalism or animal art. The 
ancient tribal art found in caves of Southern France and 
Northern Spain demonstrates significant patterns of animals' 
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essential character. As Read suggests, "the prehistoric 
artist automatically emphasized what was most important in 
the animal's form"—an enlarged head of a bull showing the 
locale of the concentration of its power, for example."3 
Likewise, a child's art exemplifies a vitalism. Again, Read 
states that a child "first scribbles aimlessly and then out 
of the graphic chaos, begins to select and isolate 
significant signs—signs for the objects nearest to his 
vital needs."11* In this case, the artistic function 
manifests in representations of the mother, father, 
siblings, self, and home. 
Similarly, Christian art initially evidenced a 
vitalism. Unlike prehistoric and child's art, the function 
of Christian art had a rhetorical function. The motivation 
was to provide the uninitiated as well as the illiterate 
with pictorial narratives which could bring these 
individuals to a state of grace important for the ultimate 
survival of the individual — immortality.'15 The purpose of 
early Christian art is observed by Ernst Kitzinger: 
The artist's main interest is his story, he is 
anxious to convey a definite message, and he 
invites us to concentrate on this rather than on 
details of form. In classical Cpagan3 works of 
art, we always find a perfect balance between 
content and form. The loss of this balance marks 
a new stage in art-history, a stage in which art 
becomes the vehicle for the propagation of certain 
doctrines."6 
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Whereas vitalism suggests the purposiveness of form to 
Christian art, the elevative function indicates a reason for 
the overshadowing of intent by the form. With elevation, 
the motivation of form is displaced in that form in 
actuality becomes simultaneously the thing signified. Form 
motivates form. 
This phenomenon is seen in the iconizing of religious 
art, which was more pronounced during the Byzantine Period. 
Religious paintings during that era came to be regarded not 
simply as illustrations for those who could not read or as 
augmentations of the text for the literate few but as actual 
truths within themselves."7 The devotion attached to these 
icons compelled the collective belief that these were "such 
perfect symbols of the Holy Truth that there appeared to be 
no need to ever depart from them."118 
A political recontextualization experiences a similar 
evolution from a position of vitalism to one of elevation. 
Political form arguably has its origins in a sort of 
vitalism. Undoubtedly, the motivations for the form were or 
were perceived to be real. For example, the United States 
was born in a threatening environment. It emerged from 
revolution. Later, continent-wide trade had to be 
instituted for economic solvency and survival. A new order 
was deemed essential to give stability to the system which 
had experienced near disaster with the Articles of 
Confederation. 
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The unifying rubric of these motivations was the 
immortality of the nation-state as was the narrative 
motivation of Christian icons to the individual. This 
superlative force, therefore, would seemingly determine the 
essential characteristics of United States political forms 
as was the case in prehistoric and early Christian art. As 
in the latter, the motivation served as the guiding 
principle behind form which educated and united the masses 
within a collective consciousness. 
But as Edelman observes of any symbolic form that 
becomes a vehicle for expressing a group interest, political 
form once descriptive becomes evocative.119 This 
transformation can be explained potentially in terms of 
aesthetic theory. Vitalism expressed by an image is by 
nature a recontextualization—significant features are 
highlighted while others are omitted. This phenomena 
registered in Byzantine art when, as noted in Kitzinger's 
description, "all signs of individual life have been 
suppressed, and faces and attitudes have become 
stereotyped."160 Likewise, political form used to express 
American foreign policy move from a position of vitalism to 
one of elevation or evocation. Kissinger apparently 
describes this rhetorical feature of U.S. foreign policy 
discourse when he states that issues are stated "in black 
and white terms. . . . Nations are treated as similar 
phenomena, and those states presenting immediate problem are 
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treated simi larly. ",ei Additionally, the incentive is extant 
according to Kissinger to state "cases in its most extreme 
form."166 
The rationale for the evolution of political form to a 
recontextualization is that this form, as Christian art, 
provide the prerequisite to myth—abstracted meaning. Both, 
motivated by hidden concepts, become enduring, commanding a 
type of encompassing piety, always ready to establish 
mythical recontextualizations of a generalized immortality. 
U.S. foreign policy discourse that is effective in 
constructing popular opinion comparable to the artifact of 
the Byzantine artist is a hermeneutic for a perceived 
reality.,E3 The Byzantine artist provided the populace with 
works, that rhetorically provided answers and means of 
instruction and allowed a sense of participation in divine 
life. These symbols, when venerated, brought about 
unification of the populace within a collective which was 
administered by the Church."2* 
American political forms when metaphorically iconized, 
the tendencies suggested by synnationalistic discourse, also 
provides answers and directions and suggest citizen 
participation in the actions of the nation-state. These 
tendencies are achieved by advocates recontextualizing 
foreign policy items as the nation-state vision. With these 
forms, the foreign policy establishment is able to convince 
the populace that proposed actions are in keeping with the 
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interests of the nation-state vision. The result is the 
promise of a sort of immortality for the citizenry. Thus, 
in much the same way the Christian icon united the 
terrestrial and celestial Church; a political 
recontextualization can be viewed as a rhetorical icon that 
persuades the populace to support the actions of its foreign 
policy establish.1" 
Of course, this analogy between the Christian icon and 
what has been suggested as a rhetorical icon is deliberately 
constructed for insights that it may give and is intended 
only as a perspective from which to analyze foreign policy 
discourse. The Christian and rhetorical icons as abstract 
ideal forms arguably have similar persuasive effects which 
may be understood in their comparable designs. However, in 
practical applications, differences do exist which may cause 
this analogy to break down. 
While these may be numerous, two striking 
dissimilarities should be noted. First, an individual 
interacts differently with the Christian icon than with the 
rhetorical icon. Christian icons were and are actual 
artistic manifestations of religious belief. The religious 
icon seemingly is approached naturally by the faithful as a 
sacred object because of its explicit, more permanent, 
visual religious context corresponding to the one already 
internalized. The rhetorical icon is more implicit. This 
political form, though artistic in nature, is a construct of 
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discourse that assumes a type of religiosity. The 
sentimental attachments to the form are only as strong as 
the temporal context its producing discourse constructs 
within the psyche of the individual. 
Second, the Christian icon, in its ideal state, had an 
imperative nature while the same may not be always true of 
the rhetorical icon. The lack of technology during the 
Byzantine era in which the religious form was conceived, 
prevented alternate messages and channels of information. 
The modern multiplicity of messages and channels, however, 
may preclude the permanency of confidence placed in the 
rhetorical icon.'" Issues have the potential for creating 
an awareness in the individual or groups of individuals that 
due to their factional importance may challenge mass 
confidence in the political form. But not withstanding 
these differences, this analogy may serve to explain why the 
rhetorical icon, either in isolation or in their 
configuration can serve to construct popular opinion. 
Summary 
This chapter proposes an analytic model for 
understanding and evaluating foreign policy discourse. It 
posits the following stages in the construction of popular 
opinion in terms of synnationalism. First, the foreign 
policy establishment constructs popular opinion through 
discourse that has synnationalistic features. These 
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features can unify people because the nation-state vision 
shares the abstract universal appeals of religious 
discourse. Second, the nation-state vision is constructed 
from historically recycled discourse suggesting interests 
important to the vision. Finally, effective foreign policy 
discourse recontextualizes policy items with those 
interests. Recontextualizing discourse constructs a 
political form producing synnationalistic tendencies and in 
so doing has the potential for constructing favorable 
popular opinion. In the next chapter, this model of 
discourse analysis is expanded further and applied to the 
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CHAPTER III 
AN APPLICATION OF THE SYNNATIONALISTIC MODEL 
OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
Although foreign policy may be guided by large 
visionary goals, its day to day implementation occurs 
through a concrete agenda of specific acts and policies. It 
is a rhetorical truism that abstract goals often enjoy far 
broader support than the specific measures that are employed 
to implement them. This is because specific policies engage 
real world constraints. They may run up against the claims 
of rival groups, the brute fact of limited resources, or the 
tug of competing loyalties. 
The United States foreign policy vision is implemented 
through a finite set of agenda items. This chapter examines 
a central agenda item, the Strategic Defense Initiative. 
The rhetorical trajectory by which public support was 
constructed and mobilized in favor of this program is a 
paradigm case of the foreign policy success formula. 
Accordingly, in the first section of the chapter, the 
agenda building process is analyzed. Section two deals with 
the ways in which constraints against public acceptance of 
foreign policy are overcome. The third section examines a 
case history to discover how popular support was gained for 
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a particularly controversial agenda item. The final section 
deals with the process of iconization as an ultimate aim of 
agenda building. This section includes an assessment of the 
success of White House strategies in the construction of 
popular opinion. This occurred because the Administration 
used synnationalistic discourse to recontextualize the 
Strategic Defense Initiative as the American mission. The 
result was that S.D.I, became a commanding persuasive 
symbol, a rhetorical icon, within the sphere of popular 
opinion. With this item, I will contend that the 
Administration was able to redefine the Reykjavik meetings 
from a conference on disarmament to an exemplum of the 
'Peace Through Strength' doctrine. 
I 
The Agenda-Building Process of American Foreign Policy 
The analysis of foreign policy discourse in this 
chapter approaches American foreign policy from a systems 
perspective.1 This systems context is consistent with what 
is generally referred to as the 'policy' process. Based on 
their research, Randall Ripley and Grace Franklin make the 
following three observations regarding policy: "1) Policy is 
what the government says and does about perceived problems; 
2) Policy making is how the government decides what will be 
done about perceived problems; and 3) Policy making is a 
process of interaction among governmental actors; policy is 
the outcome of that interaction."6 
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The systems perspective used for this analysis does not 
view the United States has having multiple foreign policies. 
Instead, U.S. foreign policy is considered to be one body 
composed of many agenda items or issues. These items are 
implemented to advance the national interest in the 
international arena. Thus 'policy' in the context of this 
discussion is considered to be the outcome of an agenda-
building process. The sum-total of these varying issues 
make-up U.S. foreign policy. 
The process of agenda-building begins when a perceived 
international exigence is brought to the national agenda. 
While 'agenda' is often used to denote a prioritizing of 
items, its application here, although it may include this 
function, is intended as Roger Cobb and Charles Elder use 
the term: "a general set of political controversies that 
will be viewed at any point in time as falling within the 
range of legitimate concerns meriting the attention of the 
polity."3 
This sphere of political concerns is divided into two 
types, systemic and institutional. The first type of agenda 
"consists of all issues that are commonly perceived by 
members of the political community as meriting public 
attention and as involving matters within the legitimate 
jurisdiction of existing governmental authority."'' The 
second type, institutional or 'formal' agenda, is the "set 
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of items explicitly up for the active and serious 
consideration of authoritative decision makers."3 
Cobb and Elder argue that the "natures of the two 
agendas are substantially different."6 The systemic agenda 
is "composed of fairly abstract and general items." These 
items "do little more than identify a problem area" and will 
"not necessarily suggest either the alternatives available 
or the means of coping with the problem." The institutional 
agenda is "more specific, concrete and limited in the number 
of items." This agenda identifies, "at least implicitly, 
those facets of a problem that are to be seriously 
considered by a decision-making body." 
In the agenda-building process, an 'issue' moves from 
the systemic to the institutional agenda. As Cobb and Elder 
suggest, "CI3t is unlikely that any issue involving 
substantial social consequences will gain standing on a 
governmental agenda unless it has first attained systemic 
agenda status."7 
For the issue to achieve recognition on the systemic 
agenda, two factors must be present: "initiator and the 
event, or triggering mechanism, that transform the problem 
into an issue."8 First, four classifications of initiators 
are common in the agenda-setting process: "readjusters," 
"exploiters," "circumstantial reactors," and 
"humanitarians."9 
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The first type of initiator "perceiveUsII an unfavorable 
bias in the distribution of positions or resources" and 
constructs an issue to "redress this imbalance."10 The 
World Zionist Organization, which was founded in 1897 and 
coordinated programs to establish a national Jewish 
homeland, might be seen as representative of this category. 
The second type of initiator, 'exploiters,' includes 
individuals or groups "who manufacture an issue for their 
own gain."11 If the invasion of Grenada by the United 
States in 1983 had been designed to foster favorable popular 
opinion for Ronald Reagan a year before the presidential 
election, the Administration arguably would be 
representative of this classification. 
'Circumstantial reactors,' the third type of initiator, 
create issues in response to an unanticipated event. The 
freezing of Iranian assets by the Carter Administration in 
response to the 1979 Hostage Crisis as well as the Bush 
Administration's 1990-91 "Operation Desert Shield/Storm" in 
reaction to the Iraqi take over of Kuwait are examples of 
this type of initiator. 
A final division is the 'humanitarian.'16 This 
classification of initiator includes persons or groups who 
bring an issue to the agenda to "acquire a psychological 
sense of well-being for doing what they believe is in the 
public interest." This type of initiator is primarily 
limited to domestic policy. However an example of the 
84 
humanitarian initiator in foreign policy includes musicians 
under the leadership of Bob Geldof who with 'Live Aid' 
raised money and created national awareness for the people 
of drought-stricken Ethiopia during 1986. 
The second factor that must be present for an issue to 
achieve systemic agenda status is a triggering device. Cobb 
and Elder argue in foreign policy these triggering devices 
are primarily external and include four types: 
The first is an act of war or military violence 
involving the United States as a direct combatant. 
Examples include the Vietnam war, the Pueblo 
seizure, and the dropping of atomic bombs on 
Hiroshima. The second category includes 
innovations in weapons technology involving such 
things as arms control, the Hotline between the 
Kremlin and the White House, and the deployment of 
an anti-ballistic system The third type is an 
international conflict in which the United States 
is not a direct combatant, such as the conflicts 
in the Middle East and the Congo. The final 
category involves changing world alignment 
patterns that may affect American membership in 
the United Nations, troop commitments in the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the American 
role in the Organization of American States.13 
Effective resolution of an exigence occurs when an item 
is moved from recognition on the systemic agenda to popular 
approval on the formal agenda. This flight-path 
necessitates a "dynamic interplay" between the initiator and 
the trigger device.1* This interplay must overcome three 
popular opinion constraints. These constraints include: 
1) Widespread attention or at least awareness; S) Shared 
concern of a sizeable portion of the population that some 
B5 
type of action is required; and 3) A shared perception that 
the matter is an appropriate concern of some governmental 
unit and falls within the bounds of its authority.18 The 
focus of this chapter now turns to the rhetorical means 
utilized by the initiators to meet these constraints. 
II 
Rhetorical Means of the Systemic Agenda 
Constraints facing an issue or item slated for the 
systemic agenda arise through the situation consisting of 
problem definition and efficacy of the solution.14 Problem 
definition is fundamental due to the fact that societal 
events are "interpreted in different ways by different 
people at different times."17 The exigence must be 
construed within limits that identify and specify interests 
that induce majority agreement. 
The second constraint, efficacy, exists due to the 
abstract nature of policy and the operating presumptions of 
foreign policy. First, to gain support for an agenda item, 
advocates should provide "good reasons" that an item will 
effectively resolve the exigence and produce desireable 
consequences.18 Meeting this aspect of the constraint is 
problematic since systemic agenda items will have never been 
tried and tested. Thus, evidence given for the adoption of 
an item will be tentative. As many reasons for rejecting 
the issue as those offered for its acceptance can be 
expected. 
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The policy establishment's belief that foreign policy 
should be a 'closed' enterprise poses a second problem in 
meeting this constraint. Even if 'good reasons' were 
available to argue the effectiveness of an item, foreign 
policy practitioners hold to the tenet that secrecy should 
be maintained, and the public should not be actively 
involved." Openly addressing this constraint would violate 
this precept. 
Because of the problems associated with the 
definitional and efficacy constraints, specialized, or 
technical, discourse in addressing them is not viable for 
the construction of popular opinion.E0 Foreign policy 
advocates meet the constraints facing an item on the 
systemic agenda primarily by means of the special resources 
of metaphoric discourse. The utility of metaphoric foreign 
policy discourse is threefold. It addresses the abstract 
situational constraints that otherwise might be lost by the 
specialized language. Second, it serves as a device for 
explaining sensitive issues without revealing particular 
details, thus maintaining secrecy. Finally, it subdues 
active involvement by the citizens in the process. 
These functions are possible because of the metaphoric 
tendencies of the discourse. Ogden and Richards suggest 
this discourse provides "context through other words."61 
Furthermore, metaphoric discourse, as Murray Edelman argues, 
allows the populace to "live in a world in which causes are 
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simple and neat and remedies are apparent. "ee The strength 
of the device, according to Edelman, is that it "can 
vividly, potently, pervasively evoke changed worlds in which 
the remedies for anxieties are clearly perceived and self 
serving causes of action are sanctified . "E3 The metaphor, 
as "an instrument for shaping political support and 
opposition and premises upon which decisions are made,"6" is 
considered effective because it makes an image of the 
"unclear and the remote."88 
The effectiveness of the metaphoric language is 
enhanced by the perceived role and situation of the 
governmental and non-governmental actors bringing the item 
to the attention of the general public. The primary 
governmental actor is historically and traditionally the 
Office of the President. The office entails a variety of 
advisory and administrative agencies—the National Security 
Council, the Cabinet, the Department of State, the 
Department of Defense, and agencies comprising the 
'Intelligence Community' as well as other sources—that 
assist agenda-setting." Non-governmental policy advocates 
are generally special interest groups comprised of economic 
interest groups, the 'military-industrial complex' and 
ethnic minorities.67 
The administration capitalizes on the public's 
perception of the constitutional roles inter alia of the 
office as well as the situation. Constitutional roles 
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include Chief of State, Chief Executive, Chief Diplomat, 
Commander in Chief and Chief Legislator. Extra 
constitutional roles encompass Chief of Party, Protector of 
the Peace, Manager of Prosperity, World Leader, Voice of the 
People, and Leader of the Rituals of American Democracy.EB 
These roles augment the persuasibi1ity of the metaphoric 
discourse by bringing a historic tradition of credibility to 
it.E9 
For the most part, special interest groups do not have 
the benefit of pre-legi t imized roles.30 Therefore, these 
groups primarily use the situation of the exigence. An 
example of such an agenda-setting effort was that of the 
American Jewish Conference, which existed from 1942-48. 
During its six year existence, the lobby brought to the U.S. 
agenda the need for a Jewish Homeland, the State of Israel. 
The group was effectively able to use the situation of the 
Jewish Holocaust to support one truism of their campaign 
that: "Israel is historic justice and serves as just 
compensation for innumeral massacres."31 
Role and situation are not only important in terms of 
providing plausibility. These create another indispensable 
asset to the advocates—power to gain access to the media in 
order to voice their cause.ae Presumably, advocates can 
hold three classes of power that are influential in gaining 
access to the media. First is what Dan Nimmo and James 
Combs define as a sort of 'celebrity' power .a3 This power 
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can be described as a presumed noteworthiness of individuals 
because of wealth, occupation, or prestige that draws 
attention of the media. Elected officials, particularly the 
President, would best exemplify advocates possessing this 
faculty. Because of the actual and perceived roles of 
office, elected officials are able to direct media attention 
to an issue. For instance, Robert MacNeil of the nationally 
acclaimed PBS MacNei1/Lehrer News Hours admitted a "certain 
amount of truth" in the proposition that the media is 
"slavish to the [presidential3 administration."3* MacNeil 
stated "where the administration turns its searchlight or 
its spotlight, we [the mediaD tend to follow more than we do 
other things. We follow the lead of the administration 
first."35 
A second class of media related power held by advocates 
can be identified as 'melodramatic.' Melodramatic power is 
the capability to influence the media due to a heightened 
piteousness or compassionate emotionalism in response to 
circumstance. As Nimmo and Combs argue, "Occasionally 
things happen that are so fantastic, involve remarkable 
characters, are vastly panoramic in scope, and prove so 
interesting to the audience" that the media construct a 
melodrama.36 This melodrama "typically involves a moral 
tale of the struggle of morality versus immorality and 
satisfies mass-audience desire for both thrilling and 
sensational fare combined with some sort of affirmation that 
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evil is punished and that morality is vindicated."37 As an 
actor in the melodrama, an advocate, either in the role of 
hero or victim, is able to express the issue that caused or 
might prevent the evil. 
Again, the American Jewish Conference may typify such 
an advocate. Immediately before and after the surrender of 
Nazi Germany, accounts surfaced concerning the atrocities 
committed against individuals of Jewish descent. Those 
reports placed the Jewish Conference in the position of 
victim in the melodrama covered by the media. Arguably, by 
using that media position, the Conference became 
instrumental in having the State of Israel formalized on the 
U.S. agenda immediately following the creation of the 
state.38 
A final classification of power providing accessibility 
to the media could be considered a combination of both 
celebrity and melodramatic power. This power is derived 
from the identification of primary advocates with others 
whom Cobb and Elder delineate as "specific publics" 
including "identification" and "attention" groups.39 
Identification groups are those individuals who would 
identify "generally" their interests or have a "persistent 
sympathy with . . . Ethel generic interests of another 
group."*0 An example of such a group is the 'Christian 
Right,' which has strong emotional attachments to the issues 
of pro-Israeli advocates. The religious collective is 
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characterized by its profound belief in the inerrancy of 
biblical scriptures. According to their interpretations, 
the State of Israel is mandatory. For the 'Second Coming' 
to occur, the Jews must be gathered in the Holy Land—a 
State of Israel.41 
Pro-Israel advocates nurture the support of the 
Christian Right which has an estimated membership between 
thirty to fifty million people. These advocates stress 
biblical morality as a "valid basis" for the "utmost in 
financial and military support to Israel.'"18 Any U.S. 
agenda item unfavorable to Israel threatens its security, 
and as one member of this identification group is reported 
to have observed, "If Israel does not survive, there is no 
place for Jesus to come back to."*3 
Attention groups are a second classification for 
individuals comprising specific publics. Although these 
individuals are "disinterested in most issues, . . . they 
are informed about and interested in certain specific 
issues. . . . CODnce an issue is raised in their sphere of 
concern, they become readily mobi 1 izable. "** Again, an 
example of these groups can be seen in the context of the 
Israeli issue. To maintain a favorable U.S. position, pro-
Israel advocates promote a bond between the State of Israel 
and its citizens and the American Jewish community. They 
appeal to the belief that Jews "denote a transnational, 
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multilingual, historical and religious group which professes 
a oneness, a unity, a whole, a solidarity."" 
Advocates attempt to convince the American Jewish 
community of a 'partnership' among all Jews. The American 
Jew has an obligation to support pro-Israeli issues. This 
tendency constructed from the alliance is discernable in a 
statement attributed to a U.S. Jewish theologian and 
political activist that: "We [members of the American 
Jewish community] have as much interest in fostering Israel 
as do Blacks in eliminating the ghettos or union members in 
maintaining the integrity of the unions."*6 
These groups gain access to the media because many 
individuals within the specific publics have celebrity 
status such as television evangelists. But more important, 
they gain the attention of the media due to their potential 
impact on U.S. decision-making and the electorial process. 
As Gerard A. Hauser contends, they "may vote and shout . . . 
they shove and claim."*' In Hauser ' s words, they 
"ejaculate."*8 Thus their access to the media would fulfill 
the melodramatic interest of the media. 
Cobb and Elder point out "for an item or an issue to 
acquire popular recognition, its supporters must have either 
access to the mass media or the resources necessary to reach 
people."*9 Role and situation serve to accomplish both 
functions. By using role and situation, the advocates 
reinforce the metaphoric discourse with credibility allowing 
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for the personification and mandate of the issues that they 
support. 
This description suggests the limitations of public 
participation in foreign policy. The discourse of that 
policy, because of its metaphoric nature, provides only an 
illusionary understanding of items. In this platonic 
process, citizens respond to "objects of belief and not of 
knowledge."30 Foreign policy decisions are limited to a 
foreign policy establishment similar to what Plato described 
as 'guardians' or 'oligarchs.' The result is what Kenneth 
Zagacki and Andrew King describe as a "further 
fragmentation" of a "delegitimizing tendency" in American 
political discourse." The people "become little more than 
spectators. "31 
By analyzing U.S. foreign policy discourse, the 
possibility exists that public participation in decision-
making may be eventually enhanced. Findings from these 
analyses, as Habermas suggests, perhaps may "make it 
possible to distinguish an accord or agreement among free 
and equals from a contingent or forced consensus. "se In the 
next two sections of this chapter such an analysis is 
attempted. The undertaking, hopefully, will show in a 
specific case, the aftermath of the Reagan-Gorbachev 
Reykjavik Meetings, the operation of the rhetorical means of 
the systemic agenda and particularly how advocates 
constructed popular opinion through the use of 
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synnationalistic rhetoric. In the first section, the 
background of the event is discussed. 
Ill 
A Case Study in Systemic Agenda Access 
At meetings held in Reykjavik, Iceland, October 11-12, 
1986, President Reagan and Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev 
worked out a "series of accords in principle that surprised 
the negotiators themselves."33 The tentative agreements 
included: 1) the banning of all medium-range missiles from 
Europe; S) the initiation of a phased accord beginning with 
verification of existing treaties with the ultimate goal of 
the cessation of nuclear testing; 3) a limitation of nuclear 
launchers, missiles and bombers, and the abolition of all 
ballistic missiles over ten years; and 4) "an agreed 
statement" concerning separated families, emigration and 
possible areas of cooperation.3* 
The series of talks, which might have produced 
"'historic gains'. . . foundered on" President Reagan's 
Strategic Defense Initiative.83 During the meetings' final 
day, Mikhail Gorbachev linked all agreements to an 
"'integral part' of the package—that the 1972 antibal1istic 
missile treaty be made binding for ten more years and that 
this be understood to restrict research and testing on new 
missile defense to the laboratory."" Reagan's rejection of 
the linkage not to curb the initiative led to the 
culmination of the two day meetings with a failure to reach 
agreement. 
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The outcome of the Reykjavik meetings created a 
threefold domestic problem for the Reagan Administration 
including: 1) negative impacts on upcoming congressional 
elections; 2) a questionable future for the Strategic 
Defense Initiative as a viable policy item; and 3) a 
possible deterioration of the Reagan Administration legacy. 
First, the Reykjavik meetings had the potential to result in 
Republican losses in the November congressional elections. 
Holloway and George assert political activity of citizens 
cluster around several concerns that focus "on standards of 
living, health, and the prospects for their children, 
including their education and opportunity of 
advancement."87 Voting can be affected by threats to these 
factors. If emotional arguments were constructed by the 
Democratic party that Reagan had created an unstable 
environment, and if these were accepted by the majority of 
citizens, Republicans, in general, could have been held 
accountable for a "major conflict" that could jeopardize 
everything" that the people "might hope for."38 
The situation was ripe for such a charge. The Soviet 
Union's arrest of U.S. journalist, Nicholas Daniloff, as 
well as the U.S. expulsion of Soviet diplomatic personnel 
during September and October of 1986 suggested a growing 
conflict between the two superpowers.39 In light of this 
situation, the Administration faced a recycled Democratic 
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accusation that the Reagan Administration was responsible 
for tensions between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. 
Although defeated earlier, this allegation would be 
harder to overcome in the wake of Reykjavik. Reagan 
initially began his term in office with what some experts 
had called a "benign neglect" toward arms control in which 
American-Soviet relations were allowed "to reach a twenty-
year low."60 The Administration in its first four years 
advocated containment of the 'Evil Empire' through U.S. 
rearmament with an average defense budget increase of eight 
point three percent leading to a proposed three hundred 
thirteen billion dollar defense budget for the first year of 
the second term.*1 This militarization posture kept alive 
the charge first levied in 1980 by the Democrats that Reagan 
was "trigger happy" and citizens' anxieties concerning 
Reagan's "warmonger image."62 
The Administration dispelled that accusation and 
relieved public fear by advancing the posture as 'Peace 
Through Strength.'63 The goal of rearmament was justified 
as a "bargaining chip" to secure negotiations with the 
Soviet Union for arms reductions.6* For instance, this 
justification, as Andrew King and Kenneth Petress write, was 
used by the Reagan White House to defuse the U.S. Nuclear 
Freeze Movement of 19B1-8S.6S King and Petress argue that 
Reagan was able to defeat the movement in part by convincing 
the American people that it was not a "universal movement, 
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but a unilateral Western Movement with no counterpart in the 
Soviet Union."66 
By rejecting Sorbechev's overtures, Reagan potentially 
threatened his justification for the U.S. build-up of 
conventional and nuclear weapons. Sorbachev's proposals 
could have been interpreted as the beginning of Soviet 
attempts at arms reductions countering the unilateral 
argument. If Reagan's justification were lost, popular 
opinion might have been convinced by arguments similar to 
that of Tom Wicker who alleged that the President "missed 
the best chance any President has had in the last two 
decades to eliminate the central security concern" of the 
United States.67 But even more detrimental, the 
Administration could have been labeled as the aggressor in 
the American-Soviet conflict by Reagan's refusal to 
negotiate. The President could have been perceived as 
escalating existing tensions between the United States and 
the Soviets. The perception persisting from October until 
November had the potential to result in the loss of critical 
Republican House and Senate seats. 
Second, the failed Reykjavik meetings threatened the 
Administration with the possible rejection of the Strategic 
Defense Initiative as a viable policy instrument or with a 
reduction of funding. The initiative received sharp 
criticisms following the meetings. Although the 
Administration described S.D.I, from its inception as the 
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solution to the Soviet problem, critics charged that the 
instrument, dubbed 'Star Wars' by the media, was little more 
than a whim.68 For instance, nuclear physicist, I. A. 
Robbie, who worked on the Manhattan Project during World War 
II, argued that S.D.I, was a "foolish" project "of an old 
man." As Robbie stated, "Think about the arrogance . . . he 
CReaganD knows nothing about this" but announces the project 
to the world "before he consults the scientists."4* Others 
argued even if deployment were feasible, the project would 
cost a "trillion or more dollars," would take a decade to 
deploy and ultimately would lead to the militarization of 
space by the superpowers.70 
Reagan's failure to negotiate the reduction of existing 
military technology due to Soviet demands placed on the non-
existing weapons system resulted in other charges. For 
instance, Reagan was accused of "protectCingD a research 
program in which some of the most distinguished American 
scientists have no faith, and for which the necessary 
computers and software do not and may never exist."71 
Furthermore, critics challenged the effects to the program 
resulting from limitations demanded by the Soviets in 
exchange for the arms reduction agreement. Opponents argued 
that the condition of confining S.D.I, research to the 
laboratory, "would have no significant effect" on the 
project. Some critics even alleged that the limitation 
"might speed technical progress if showy demonstrations in 
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orbit were foregone for more exacting ones on earth."76 If 
a convincing case had been made from these arguments, 
popular opinion could have rejected the initiative or 
supported a reduction of its funding.73 
More important than loss of S.D.I.'s funding were the 
long term impacts that arguments arising from Reykjavik 
might have on the Reagan legacy. Reagan could be faulted as 
a dogmatic President who refused to sacrifice a "dubious 
vision" for the security of the United States.7" If this 
occurred, future attempts to block the Administration agenda 
would be supported by popular opinion. In such a case, the 
Executive would become ineffectual as an agenda-setter for 
both foreign and domestic policy. The Reagan White House 
would risk being regarded as extremist and as impotent in 
policy matters. Conceivably, the Republican Party could 
receive the blunt from this negative legacy of its standard 
bearer. The party could be linked to the Administration's 
negative record, losing policy decisions and other 
elections. 
Three days following the meetings, however, the Reagan 
Administration was able to effectively construct popular 
opinion that supported its actions at Reykjavik. In so 
doing, the Administration resolved the potential tripartite 
domestic problem created by the meetings. For instance, 
despite the rhetoricity of the questions, a White House poll 
conducted on October 14th, two days following the meetings, 
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gave an indication that "overall [popular] approval of . . . 
Reagan's handling of his job had jumped from sixty-four 
percent among one thousand people interviewed October ninth 
and tenth, to seventy-three percent among five hundred 
interviewed . "75 
Findings from the White House poll were supported by a 
Times/CBS News Poll taken on October 14th and 15th. The 
survey suggested that in "almost all population groups" 
questioned, including Democrat as well as Republican 
respondents, "more than twice as many blamed Mr. Gorbachev 
as blamed the President for the lack of agreement in 
Reykjavik. "7A 
This positive perception occurred because the White 
House met the rhetorical problem created by the Reykjavik 
meetings. The rhetorical problem facing the Administration 
was the "initial assessment that the meetings had broken 
down in anger, that arms control prospects had dimmed and 
that United States-Soviet relations were off-course."" 
When the meetings stalemated, Reagan was described as 
"grim-faced, even angry."78 A key official in the 
Administration was quoted as saying: "The President was 
just furious. He was steaming angry when he came out of 
that door with Gorbachev. We all felt that we had come so 
close to pulling this off, and yet we couldn't."79 
One official described Secretary of State George Shultz 
"as looking haggard and drained" when he delivered a 
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nationally televised press conference the day the meeting 
ended.80 In that description, the official is reported to 
have said that he had "never seen Shultz exude through his 
word, the pace of his comments, his facial expressions, such 
disappointment and defeat."81 The Administration's 
frustration registered in Shultz's conclusion to his opening 
remarks when he told the American people that the White 
House was "deeply disappointed at this outcome."86 
The change in perception occurred because the 
Administration was able to redefine the Reykjavik meetings. 
That redefinition hinged on the White House's ability to 
market an agenda item. While the rhetorical problem arose 
from the collapse of the Reykjavik meetings, the breakdown 
producing the problem was attributed to a Reagan agenda 
instrument. The President had refused to consider 
limitations on his Strategic Defense Initiative, which was a 
component of 'Peace Through Strength.' Therefore the sine 
qua non of a Reykjavik redefinition depended on constructing 
popular support for the agenda item. 
The Administration accomplished this by: 1) using 
rhetorical strategies to construct popular support for the 
'Peace Through Strength' posture, particularly the Strategic 
Defense Initiative on the systemic agenda; and 2) using that 
endorsement to change the image of the meetings. The 
suggestion that popular opinion construction occurred at the 
systemic level of the agenda process is based on Cobb and 
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Elder's argument that formalized issues take a long time in 
achieving that status.83 If Cobb and Elder are correct, a 
reasonable assumption is that 'Peace Through Strength' and 
S.D.I, had never reached the formal agenda. 
The Reagan Administration began its first term with 
expressed concern over domestic spending with defense 
receiving little emphasis. The White House began to set a 
defense agenda for increased spending by the 1988 mid-term 
elections. However, in March of 1983, Administration 
defense spending requests were being seriously questioned by 
both Democrats and Republicans.6'' The 'bargaining chip' 
basis for the expenditures additionally raised doubt in 
November of that year when the Soviets walked out of medium 
range nuclear missile negotiating sessions over the issue of 
U.S. deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles in 
Western Europe.85 
By the beginning of the second Reagan term in 1985, the 
defense budget was coming under "especially close 
scrutiny."86 Foreign policy instruments, including both the 
MX missile and the Strategic Defense Initiative, the latter 
being in the planning stage, were threatened with budgetary 
extinction. Even though the White House had pushed for 
approval of the defense agenda as part of the formal agenda 
as early as 198S, popular support for the items was not 
strong enough in 1986 for necessary institutional status. 
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The potential for a negative popular opinion created by 
Reykjavik further impacted the status of the Reagan 
Strategic Defense Initiative. For instance, the ranking 
Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Clairborne Pell was quoted as saying: 
This is a sad day for mankind. I deeply 
regret the failure to achieve an agreement when we 
were virtually on its brink. As I said a year 
ago, the obvious compromise was, is and will be, a 
deep reduction in strategic offensive weapons in 
exchange for an equivalent limitation on the 
Strategic Defense Initiative." 
In essence we have given up a bird in the 
hand, for two in the bush, S.D.I.87 
The Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee asserted 
that Congress "would put Star Wars under more scrutiny and 
fire than ever before."88 
Subsequently, at the time of the Reykjavik meetings, 
the three constraints necessary for formal agenda status of 
Reagan's defense agenda had never been met. The White House 
had not effectively acquired a mass public acceptance of 
'Peace Through Strength' and S.D.I, as being needed and 
appropriate. The concern triggered by Reykjavik over 
Reagan's policy issues demanded a re-emergence and/or 
renewal of these items at the systemic level. 
Based on this assumption, the Reagan Administration can 
be viewed as 'circumstantial reactor' as well as 'exploiter' 
initiators for revitalizing its defense agenda. The 
unexpected Reykjavik situation necessitated the first 
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initiator role. The belief reportedly held by the 
Administration prior to the meetings was that Reykjavik 
would serve only as a preliminary for scheduling a 1987 
summit in the United States between Gorbachev and Reagan. 
The meetings were not for purposes of actual proposal 
negot iations. 
Since the meetings were considered of limited 
consequence, the talks were hastily planned. White House 
Chief of Staff, Donald T. Regan recalled that on September 
19, 1986, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze 
delivered a letter to President Reagan from Gorbachev 
proposing a meeting "as soon as possible" between the two 
leaders for purposes of discussing the complete elimination 
of Soviet and U.S. intermediate-range nuclear missiles from 
Europe. This itinerary was expanded to include discussions 
pertaining to human rights violations, regional conflicts, 
and bilateral relations.89 On September 30, Reagan 
publicly announced the Iceland meetings slated to begin 
eleven days later. Because of Administration skepticism 
concerning the meetings' outcome, the President concentrated 
on other governmental matters during that time. His 
Reykjavik preparations were limited to briefings by advisors 
and to carrying "homework" to the presidential quarters of 
the White House.90 
Reports from Iceland indicated the Administration was 
surprised by the proposals Gorbachev brought to the series 
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of talks." According to one official, Reagan at one point 
told his U.S. delegation: "This wasn't supposed to be a 
summit. We aren't supposed to be in these negotiations.*6 
In the aftermath of Reykjavik, the Administration had 
to address charges that the meetings' failure was due to the 
White House's extreme haste and poor preparedness. Former 
Secretary of Defense in the Kennedy and Johnson 
Administrations, Robert McNamara, assessed the meetings as 
"ill-planned."93 Although McNamara gave the President 
"tremendous credit for the imagination and courage with 
which he presented his ideas," he argued the "matter had not 
been thought through by our government. It hadn't been 
discussed with our Joint Chiefs. It hadn't been discussed 
with our allies.""' The situation mandated that the 
Administration dodge any indication the "American side got 
into areas that had not been thoroughly prepared for 
beforehand. "9S 
The Administration performed the second role, 
exploiter, due to the possibility of Reykjavik's political 
ramifications. Political fall-out from the meetings 
apparently seemed real for the Administration as well as 
others vying internally and externally for political gain. 
Within the U.S. campaign arena, reports being circulated 
suggested that Democratic hopes of a November victory had 
been heightened, and Republican expectations had been 
"dashed" by the meetings' lack of positive closure." 
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The Soviet Union stood to profit politically from the 
meetings' collapse, as well. Senior Soviet officials, 
"including advisers to Mr. Gorbachev from the Government and 
Party, several of them members of the Central Committee," 
reportedly claimed that if "a convincing case" could be made 
that "Reagan blocked a chance to curtail the arms race by 
insisting on continued development of a space-based missile 
defense system," the USSR could achieve a two-fold public 
relations victory.97 According to the officials, the Soviet 
Union could influence the outcome of critical November 
elections and, more importantly, could make "inroads in 
Western Europe," weakening the NATO Alliance.98 Both of 
these public relation attempts were apparent at a press 
conference held by Soviet Leader Gorbachev on his departure 
from Reykjavik: 
I think you are here representing the people 
of the world and you know that the world is in 
turmoil. The world is concerned. The world 
demands leaders of the Soviet Union and the United 
States display political will, display 
determination to stop the trends that are leading 
towards dangerous and unpredictable consequences. 
. . .1 feel the President probably would have to 
seek the advice of Congress, of American political 
leaders, of the American Public. Let America 
think. We are waiting. We are not withdrawing 
the proposals that we have put forward and I would 
say the proposals on which, substantially, we have 
agreed. 
Now secondly, I think that all realistically 
minded forces in the world should now begin to 
act.99 
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Unless the perception were changed, the failed 
Reykjavik meetings would represent a potential political 
weapon against the Administration and the Republican Party. 
The Administration was placed therefore in a position of 
having to exploit rhetorically for its advantage the 
unexpected events of Reykjavik brought on by its agenda 
item. 
Aboard Air Force One from Iceland to Andrews Air Force 
Base, hours following Shultz's press conference and a 
nationally televised departure address by Reagan, the White 
House developed a two part strategy for addressing the 
rhetorical problem of Reykjavik.100 The program reportedly 
was described by Patrick J. Buchanan, Director of White 
House Communications, as "the most extensive and intensive 
communications plan" that he had "ever been associated with 
in the White House.'"01 The campaign's purpose was to 
deliver to the American people a message concerning 
Reykjavik favorable to the Administration. 
The first part of the campaign was to capitalize on the 
melodrama of the Reykjavik meetings to gain access for 
spokespersons approved by the Administrat ion .,0E By doing 
this, the Administration attempted what U.P.I. Bureau Chief, 
Helen Thomas, noted 'dean' of the White House Press Corp 
alleges is the aim of all administrations—to provide "snap 
shots" of information that administrations treat as "their 
private preserve." According to Thomas, "The White House 
10B 
doesn't want us to ask questions. They want us to see only 
what they want us to see.'"03 
Donald T. Regan, the White House Chief of Staff, in his 
decision "to place major Administration officials on the 
record before virtually any television, newspaper, magazine 
or radio outlet that asked for them" could provide its 
version of Reykjavik as the authoritative one and perhaps 
keep the drama of Reykjavik alive until a favorable popular 
opinion could be constructed.10* All White House officials 
involved in the campaign were to speak "on the record and by 
name attached to the individual talking."105 Larry Speaks, 
White House spokesman, told reporters, "If you receive 
information on a background basis from a senior 
Administration official, from here on out that senior 
Administration official may not be plugged into what's going 
on. "10* 
The public relations campaign began on October 13th, 
the day following the close of the meetings with NATO 
members being briefed by Secretary of State Shultz and a 
nationally televised address by Ronald Reagan.107 By October 
l̂ tth, the public relations campaign had been transformed 
into a "full-blown publicity blitz."108 For instance, 
President Reagan "spent almost" the entire day of October 
l^th discussing the Iceland meetings with congressional 
leaders, newspaper columnists and television news anchors, 
and foreign policy and national security officials. On 
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October 13th and 14th, the schedules of the Secretary of 
State and John T. Poindexter, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, "focused on the summit." Their coast-to-
coast activities included appearances on televised news 
programs, meetings with newspaper editors and reporters, and 
news conferences.'09 
The second component of the White House strategy was to 
provide the American public with a consistent suasory 
message that the Strategic Defense Initiative was a 
necessary agenda item. In light of this assessment, 
Reagan's refusal to sacrifice S.D.I, would be a fitting 
response. Reykjavik would be a success. Buchanan was 
quoted as saying: 
From the early instant analysis, all you got was 
that the summit collapsed because the President 
was intransigent on S.D.I. That's simplistic and 
false. We have the whole story. So Regan, 
Shultz, Poindexter, and the President a,rs going on 
the record in as many forums as we can to tell the 
story.110 
The message constructed by the Administration followed 
the positive thematic parameter used by Shultz in his 
Reykjavik press conference and Reagan's nationally televised 
departure address delivered at Keflavik, Iceland.111 This 
theme arguably was followed because it was already in the 
public domain, but more importantly, the theme assimilated 
the events of Reykjavik into Reagan's established persona.112 
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Supporters and even more objective political analysts 
suggest that the popular appeal of Reagan resided in his 
image. For instance, James Brady, Reagan's White House 
Press Secretary, writes that Reagan was able to "flourish" 
as the "Great Communicator" because the "man and the 
President" were "inseparable." He conducted "his presidency 
based on the same fundamental principles that . . . guided 
his life."113 Likewise, Hedrick Smith argues Reagan's 
appeal "had ridden on image: his image of steadfastness, 
his image as a man of principle, his image of uncompromising 
refusal to deal with the devil."1'* 
By recycling this theme in the redefinition of 
Reykjavik, the Administration provided narrative rationality 
to its message. According to Walter Fisher, this quality 
can determine "whether or not one 'should' accept a story, 
whether or not a story is indeed trustworthy and 
reliable.""5 The resulting appeal of the Administration's 
message, therefore, can be credited to the Reagan persona, 
"his character, his commitment to his philosophy . . . , and 
the coherence of his position," much as Fisher explains the 
allure of Socrates' story told in the Sorqias.116 
In their statements, Reagan and Shultz embraced the 
President's persona suggesting the noble resolve of the 
Administration as opposed to the ignoble motive of the 
Soviets. Reagan was portrayed as a hard working negotiator 
who went to Iceland "to advance the cause of peace" and who 
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"put on the table the most far-reaching arms-control 
proposals in history." As Shultz described, Reagan "was 
constructive in reaching out and using his creativity and 
ingenuity." Further, Shultz argued the President was 
willing to make concessions. But at the same time, he 
"would not turn away from the basic security interests of 
the United States, or allies and the free world." 
This motive was contrasted with the negative Soviet 
intent that "rejected" the noble cause. The difference 
manifested by Soviet limitations on S.D.I. Shultz described 
the Strategic Defense Initiative as having "the nature of an 
insurance policy—insurance against cheating, insurance 
against somebody getting hold of these weapons." S.D.I, 
would "maintain an effective shield for the United States, 
for our allies, for the free world." Soviet attempts to 
link the proposals to the initiative, which Reagan professed 
as a "defensive shield," were described by Shultz as 
"perhaps a indication of where they're headed." 
White House officials built upon this theme during the 
massive public relations campaign constructing a three part 
scenario of Reykjavik that: 1) contraposed the American 
with the Soviet motive; S) suggested how the American motive 
overcame the U.S.S.R's; and 3) proposed the benefits of 
Reykjavik. First, the Soviet Union was represented as 
having initiated the Reykjavik meetings with a "letter from 
the General Secretary saying, "Please come meet me in 
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Iceland."117 Even though most of his advisors saw the risks 
involved, Reagan, "felt it was important to try." At the 
talks, Reagan was willing to negotiate and to make 
concessions in areas "important to the United States and our 
allies. "1,B 
The Soviet motive for instigating the negotiating 
process was an attempt to accomplish what its 1983 walk-out 
of the Geneva negotiations sessions had failed to do, to 
weaken support for Reagan's defense agenda. The 
Administration argued that from the time the Soviet 
delegation had walked out of the Geneva arms reduction talks 
until Gorbachev contacted Reagan, the U.S.S.R. had been 
testing American determination and challenging NATO's 
accord. But during the course of the "year and a half when 
they walked out of the talks," IMf missiles were deployed in 
Europe with the approval of European allies as the North 
Atlantic Alliance had became more united.119 Soviet 
participation in the Reykjavik meetings ultimately was 
designed to bring about reductions in 'Peace Through 
Strength' and "kill" S.D.I.160 
If and when that plan failed and the meetings 
deadlocked, the Soviets would then use propaganda that would 
eventually force American arms reduction. Paul Nitze, 
Special Presidential Advisor on Arms Control, argued that 
the Soviets intended to use the lack of final conclusion at 
the summit as a means for "creating divisions between the 
113 
United States and . . . Cits3 various allies around the 
world and within the various countries including the United 
States as well."161 
Second, according to the Administration's scenario, 
Reagan's resolve halted this Soviet attempt. Reagan stated 
that he entered into the negotiations with "no illusions 
about the Soviets or their ultimate intentions. We were 
publicly candid about the critical moral distinctions 
between totalitarianism and democracy."188 Reagan observed, 
"the principal objective of American foreign policy" is "not 
just the prevention of war but the extension of freedom" and 
a "commitment to the growth of democratic government and 
democratic institutions around the world." These two goals 
were protected by Reagan. 
Reagan argued that during the meetings he proposed "the 
most sweeping and generous arms control proposal in history. 
. . . EHeD offered the complete elimination of all ballistic 
missiles—Soviet and American—from the face of the earth by 
1996. "iaa Furthermore, Reagan "didn't limit Cthe 
negotiations] to just arms reductions. . . . CHe3 discussed 
. . . violation of human rights on the part of the 
Soviets. " 
The perseverance of the presidency was tested by unfair 
Soviet demands placed on the American proposals: 
This may have been the most sweeping and 
important arms reduction proposal in the history 
of the world. But it wasn't good enough for Mr. 
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Gorbachev. He wanted more. He wanted us to 
accept even tighter limits on S.D.I, than the ABM 
treaty now requires. That is to stop all but 
laboratory research. He knew this meant killing 
the Strategic Defense Initiative entirely, which 
has been the Soviet goal from the start. 
Of course, the Soviet Union has long been 
engaged in extensive strategic defense programs of 
its own. And unlike ours, the Soviet program goes 
well beyond research—even to deployment. The 
Soviet proposal would have given them an immediate 
one-sided advantage and a dangerous one. I could 
not and would not agree to that. I won't settle 
for anything unless it's in the interest of 
American Secur i ty .,e* 
Reagan, who professed that he preferred "no agreement 
than to bring home a bad agreement to the United States," 
rejected the linkage alleging that "CwDhat Mr. Gorbachev was 
demanding at Reykjavik was that the United States agree to a 
new version of a fourteen year-old ABM treaty that the 
Soviet Union has already violated. . . . CHeD told him we 
don't make those kinds of deals in the United States: 
I told him I had pledged to the American people 
that I would not trade away S.D.I.—there was no 
way I could tell our people their government would 
not protect them against nuclear destruction. I 
went to Reykjavik determined that everything was 
negotiable except two things our freedom and our 
future.1" 
By constructing this narrative of the President 
standing up to the Soviet Union, the Administration drew 
from the consistency of a forty year Cold War consensus that 
a strong U.S. diplomacy is the best defense against 
Communism. This Kennan philosophy demands a pragmatic and 
"hardheaded handling of a rigorously appraised situation 
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. . . not to make the world wonderful but to save it from 
the worst consequences of its follies"166: 
Russians will pursue a flexible policy of 
piecemeal presumption and encroachment of other 
people's interest, hoping that no single action 
will appear important enough to produce a strong 
reaction on the part of their opponents, and that 
in this way they may gradually bring about a major 
improvement in their position before the other 
fellow knows what's up. . . . Whoever deals with 
them must therefore be sure to maintain at all 
times an attitude of decisiveness and alertness in 
the defense of his own interests ,,e7 
In keeping with this philosophy, the Secretary of State 
observed that he thought "it was good for the Soviets to see 
that in Ronald Reagan they are up against somebody who is 
capable of saying 'no' as well as capable of saying 'yes,' 
who will judge the interests of the United States and hold 
firm for them."1EB Buchanan echoed this popular sentiment 
that "CwDhen the President of the United States stands up 
for the national security of this country and takes that 
kind of firestorm, I think that the average American will 
say, 'I trust Ronald Reagan. He did the right thing in the 
national security interest.' "le, 
The final component of the White House scenario was 
Reykjavik's impact on the substance and direction of future 
negotiations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the 
aftermath of the meetings. This element of the scenario 
attempted to dispel the image constructed by the media that 
the negotiations had failed. The Administration attempted 
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to construct a rival narrative that the meetings had laid 
the foundation for future meetings. 
Again, this strategy followed the Kennan thought. The 
narrative suggested by the Administration assumes the 
U.S.S.R. will negotiate when "they themselves want something 
and feel themselves in a dependent position."130 For 
instance, Buchanan challenged the media's report by arguing 
that they "went into something . . . of a collective panic 
in their descriptions" of a "col lapse. ",31 Although, he 
admitted that Gorbachev "was very tough in his statement," 
Buchanan stressed that Gorbachev "didn't say 'I'm never 
going to the United States to a summit.'" 
This observation augmented Reagan's position that: 
"The United States put good, fair ideas out on the table 
. . . CthatH won't go away. Good ideas . . . have a life of 
their own."13E This contention was supported by other White 
House officials who argued that the importance of the 
meetings was "the substance of what is possible. "l3a 
The outcome of this scenario was a redefinition of the 
Reykjavik meetings. Secretary of State Shultz appraised the 
meetings as "not a question of how it appears, it's a matter 
of what happened: 
Now the strategic nuclear weapons are more 
numerous and more deadly and of course they're 
pointed at the United States so we went to 
Reykjavik very much in mind willing to engage on 
that subject. And as it turned out, we were able 
to. And we were able to bring off an agreement 
with Mr. Gorbachev contingent, to be sure, but, 
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nevertheless, to nail down a cutting in half of 
those weapons and to do it in a manner that makes 
sense from our standpoint. That is category by 
category. . . . 
And so as we have assessed it, and others 
have. We have said, "Now look at these 
accomp 1 ishments . ",3* 
For this assessment of Reykjavik to 'work,' popular 
opinion had to find Administration statements credible that 
the United States needed the Strategic Defense Initiative. 
After all, the failure to reach positive closure making the 
'possibilities' of Reykjavik 'contingent' rather than a 
reality resulted from Reagan's refusal to sacrifice his 
'vision.' 
The White House seemed to be facing a rhetorical 
dilemma. On one hand, the Administration was publicly 
advocating that the "supreme need . . . is for man to learn 
to live together in peace and harmony . . . where peace 
reigns and freedom is enshr ined. "l3a But at the same time, 
the Administration was advocating its defense agenda that 
entailed the rebuilding of the U.S. military.i3A Without an 
element bolstering these agenda items, particularly S.D.I., 
the resolve of the President and his commitment to the 
nonexistent weapons system, might have appeared absurd. 
Soviet demands could have seemed reasonable. Ultimately, a 
redefinition of Reykjavik would be more difficult if not 
impossible. 
To persuade the American people of S.D.I.'s viability, 
the Administration used arguments that previously had been 
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used to gain support for the agenda item and buttressed 
these with new arguments derived from the situation. 
First, the White House followed a similar strategy for the 
Strategic Defense Initiative as the one used by the 
Administration for its defense agenda when it first emerged 
systemically. The Administration argued that "above all, 
beginning to work on the Strategic Defense Initiative . . . 
spurred the Soviets to negotiate seriously."137 Reagan 
maintained that the existence of this agenda item and its 
popular support, both domestically and internationally, and 
the awareness of this fact by the U.S.S.R. left them with no 
choice but to bargain.138 The Administration also argued 
that S.D.I.'s intent was one of peace, replacing the 
"insanity" of the Mutual Assured Destruction defense 
posture.139 
Along with these premises, the White House offered new 
arguments for the Strategic Defense Initiative in the 
context of Reykjavik. The White House used questions 
concerning the Soviet motive for the meetings as proof for 
the necessity of the agenda item. Reagan stated that he 
made proposals that "could satisfy" Soviet "concern while 
protecting" U.S. "principles and secur i ty . "1*° The rejection 
of those proposals raised several "critical" questions on 
which Reagan said the "American people should reflect: 
How does the defense of the United States threaten 
the Soviet Union or anyone else? Why are the 
Soviets so adamant that America remain forever 
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vulnerable to Soviet rocket attack? As of today, 
all free nations are utterly defenseless against 
Soviet missiles, fired either by accident or 
design. Why does the Soviet Union insist that we 
remain so—forever?'*1 
The one answer to these questions was the ignoble 
motive of the Soviet Union that sought to gain an advantage 
over the U.S. and its allies. As Buchanan reasoned, "If the 
Soviets were genuinely sincere in arms control and wanted to 
get rid of nuclear weapons, they would have . . . 
[negotiated] in a second.'"*2 But according to Buchanan, the 
U.S.S.R. refused to give up, in anyway, its military power," 
because their power is the "one thing that makes them 
feared, respected, enables them to terrify and intimidate 
people," and "that almost separates them from being a third-
world country."1*3 
In addition to, and not mutually exclusive from the 
Soviet motive, the agenda item was identified with a 
presidency defending American interests. In his address to 
members of the Arms Control Staff, using a device that 
Kenneth Burke describes as a "representative anecdote"1** 
that provided in itself a summation of the public relations 
campaign, Reagan claimed, "The Soviet proposal would have 
given them an immediate one-sided advantage and a dangerous 
one. I could not and would not agree to that."1*8 While 
Reagan was "willing to go the extra mile," to offer 
proposals, "when he saw something that he felt was not in 
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the interest of the United States, he had the courage to say 
'No.1 It was time to walk away from it.""1* 
Finally, S.D.I, was linked to positive repercussions of 
Reykjavik. First, by standing up for U.S. interests, Reagan 
had taught the Soviets a "lesson": America could not be 
tricked.1*7 Second, the agenda item was asserted to be 
"paying dividends" evidenced by the "progress on the issue 
of arms control" at Reykjavik.1*8 "For the first time in a 
long while, Soviet-American negotiations in the area of arms 
reductions" were "moving and moving in the right direction— 
not just toward arms control, but toward arms reductions." 
Reagan, in another representative anecdote, observed 
that "if there is one impression I carry away with me from 
these October talks, it is that, unlike the past, we are 
dealing now from a position of strength, and for that reason 
we have it within our grasp to move speedily with the 
Soviets toward even more breakthroughs."1*9 In keeping with 
this final argument, the White House asserted that the 
Strategic Defense Initiative guaranteed future negotiations 
that would benefit from the Reykjavik meetings. As Shultz 
surmised, Reykjavik was only one stage of many in a natural 
bargaining process.130 
The arguments the White House used to support S.D.I, is 
exemplified in the justification Reagan offered concerning 
his actions at Reykjavik that protected the Initiative: 
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I realize some Americans may be asking 
tonight: Why not accept Mr. Gorbachev's demand? 
Why not give up S.D.I, for this agreement? 
The answer, my friends, is simple. S.D.I, is 
America's insurance policy that the Soviet Union 
would keep the commitments made at Reykjavik. 
S.D.I, is America's security guarantee—if 
the Soviets should—as they have done too often in 
the past—fail to comply with their solemn 
commitments. 
S.D.I, is what brought the Soviets back to 
arms control talks at Geneva and Iceland. 
S.D.I, is the key to a world without nuclear 
weapons.,5t 
The rhetorical bonding of the Reagan Strategic Defense 
Initiative with national security interests [opposite those 
of the Soviet's] and the strength of the President allowed 
for the redefinition of the failed Iceland meetings. As the 
opinion polls taken October l^th and 15th seemed to suggest, 
popular opinion was constructed that seemed favorable to 
Administration actions. From these aggregate measures, the 
majority of Americans passively seemed to accept 
Administration charges that: the Soviets were responsible 
for the failure to reach accord; the President should not 
have given up S.D.I; and the talks even though not 
successful would lead to other more profitable negotiating 
sessions. 
The Strategic Defense Initiative became a rhetorical 
instrument to persuade the people that Reykjavik was 
successful. The Administration's unwillingness to make 
concessions concerning this item that resulted in the 
stalemated meetings, in effect, produced the positive image 
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for Reykjavik. Reagan stated, "The American people don't 
mistake the absence of a final agreement for the absence of 
progress. "iae "So you can see, we made progress in Iceland. 
And we will continue to make progress if we pursue a 
prudent, deliberate, and above all, realistic approach with 
the Soviets."153 
Not only did the White House public relations campaign 
accomplish its primary objective of overcoming the 
rhetorical problem created by Reykjavik, it perhaps 
fulfilled a second function of more enduring effects. By 
adapting the Strategic Defense Initiative to a position of a 
rhetorical device, they moved the item from the systemic to 
the institutional agenda. 
Particularly, to construct S.D.I, as an effective 
instrument of persuasion, the Administration had to, and did 
in fact, make the 'vision' of S.D.I seem real for the 
majority of the populace. This was done by the 
Administration using the popular attention that S.D.I, had 
attracted to its advantage to construct a symbolic identity 
for the initiative. For instance, Buchanan was quoted as 
saying "Gorbachev has done more for S.D.I, in one week than 
we've been able to do in a year.'""' 
As a symbolic entity, S.D.I arguably enjoyed an 
existence analogous to that of other phenomena having their 
"bases in symbolism and not in fact," a "comparatively 
unflexible, rigid form of adaptation."1" The possible 
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result was that S.D.I became interwoven with the American 
vision, and as posited by Sam Donaldson, White House 
Correspondent for ABC News, comparable to "something that 
goes along with the founding principles of this country, as 
a bedrock which we won't give up"136 Although the statement 
is hyperbolic, Donaldson's opinion may be reflective of the 
popular attitude concerning S.D.I in the context of 
redefining Reykjavik. 
Recontextualized, S.D.I tended to "reflect structural 
and institutional biases found within the system," which, 
according to Cobb and Elder, is the nature of items having 
formal agenda status,1" The rhetorical means used by the 
Administration and opinion leaders for persuading the 
populace that the Strategic Defense Initiative was a 
necessary agenda item perhaps would result in this quality. 
This possibility is considered in the next section. 
IV 
S.D.I. As a Rhetorical Icon 
The foreign policy process by its nature attempts to 
limit domestic advocacy. The foreign policy establishment, 
during negotiations of the type that occurred at Reykjavik, 
would perceive itself at a disadvantage if the foreign 
participant knew the U.S. bargaining position that had 
already been debated or was being debated domestically while 
negotiations were on going. In the case of Reykjavik, the 
establishment would probably feel that General Secretary 
Gorbachev would have had only to wait for American public 
opinion to register unfavorably toward the Reagan White 
House. The President might feel more compelled to accept 
the U.S.S.R.'s proposals because of the impacts facing the 
Reagan White House. Therefore the foreign policy 
establishment attempts to prevent public participation in 
the process. 
The advocacy process is delimited by constructing 
popular opinion. The establishment constructs majority 
opinion supporting U.S. agenda items by using discourse that 
produces synnationalistic tendencies. The argument proposed 
in this section is that the Administration used the 
discourse to recontextualize the Strategic Defense 
Initiative on the systemic agenda to construct popular 
opinion supporting its actions at Reykjavik 
The discourse used during the White House public 
relations campaign recontextualized the defensive 'vision' 
of the Strategic Defense into a broader vision. S.D.I.'s 
recontextualization made the initiative seem more viable for 
the American people. For instance, following Ronald 
Reagan's national broadcast concerning Reykjavik, Tom Foley, 
then Democratic Whip in the U.S. House of Representatives, 
complained that the President "treats and has always treated 
S.D.I, as if it were an existing technology that we're 
prepared to put into space to protect us against nuclear 
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attack. It's only the possibi 1 i ty . ",SB General Daniel 
Graham, U.S. Army, Ret., reiterated Foley's observation: 
. . . I thought that when the President said 
for the first time that he didn't want his own 
options cut down, not some future President, that 
finally the President has been convinced that we 
have readily deployable S.D.I, systems right now. 
That a decision to deploy at least three layers of 
defense is available to the President, now. So I 
don't think that it's something way off in the 
future.1" 
The Time/CBS News Poll, which showed a marked increase in 
the number of people who believed S.D.I would work, 
indicated that apparently the majority of American citizens 
trusted the President.160 
At the time of Reykjavik, S.D.I, resided only on the 
systemic agenda, existing in the laboratory or on blueprint. 
The systemic agenda, according to Cobb and Elder, is 
"composed of fairly abstract and general items that do 
little more than identify a problem area. It will not 
necessarily suggest either the alternatives available or the 
means of coping with the problem."161 
When Ronald Reagan introduced the Strategic Defense 
Initiative during a speech in 1983, the intent of the 
address was not designed specifically for advancement of the 
proposal.1" Instead, the speech was intended to gain an 
advantage in a debate over defense spending. In the speech 
Reagan discussed numerous areas of Soviet military build-up. 
At the conclusion of the address, he suggested a potential 
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for overcoming the threat of Soviet strategic nuclear 
missiles. This proposal was not a concretized plan but only 
an "effort to define a long-term research and development 
program to begin to achieve . . . Cthe] ultimate goal of 
eliminating the threat. ",6a But until such a program could 
be conceived, which he argued might not occur "before the 
end of the century," Reagan argued for increasing existing 
armaments. These increases, including "modernizing . . . 
strategic forces" and "improving . . . non-nuclear 
capabilities," would enable the U.S. to "pursue real 
reductions in nuclear arms . . . from a position of 
strength" and "reduce the risk of a conventional military 
conflict. ",6* 
When the Reykjavik meetings occurred, the Reagan 
Administration still described the Strategic Defense 
Initiative as an item for the prevention of an attack by 
incoming strategic Soviet missiles. This description 
provided by the Administration did not tell how the 
initiative would work.143 For example, Secretary of State 
Shultz described S.D.I, immediately following the meetings 
as a "vigorous presence . . . in the nature of an insurance 
policy . . . Cthat] would maintain an effective shield for 
the United Statrs, for our allies, for the free world. ",6A 
But three days later he stated, "I don't know who knows what 
S.D.I, is."167 The Strategic Defense Initiative in this 
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state was only an abstraction that had been contextualized 
as an defensive item. 
Popular support was constructed for Administration 
actions at Reykjavik S.D.I, because the public relations 
campaign was able to recontextualize S.D.I. This 
recontextualization was a product of the discourse of the 
public relations campaign. The Administration, as 
initiators of the systemic agenda item, wittingly or not, 
was able to attach existing political archetypes that 
construct the American vision to S.D.I. This 
recontextualization was accepted by popular opinion. 
The Administration drew primarily from the extant 
heterogeneity between the United States and the Soviet Union 
as its reservoir for the recontextualization of S.D.I. As 
argued, historic and recycled discourse is assimilated by 
individuals producing positive and negative archetypes. 
Negative archetypal images of the U.S.S.R. have been derived 
as the result of originating discourse from the "Red Scare" 
period <1945-1950's) and discursively recycled during the 
Cold War era.168 Writing during the earlier period, FBI 
Director, J. Edgar Hoover, argued that the Soviet attempt 
was to subvert the United States making it a part of their 
system.149 This intention was in keeping with Winston 
Churchill's conviction that the U.S.S.R. "desireCdD the 
fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power 
and doctrines."170 Hoover later described that doctrine, as 
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a "brutal, godless, materialistic way of life which would 
ruthlessly destroy . . . [American] values and ideals" and 
as a "deadly menace; a scourge which threatens the very 
existence of Western civilization."171 
These sentiments are kept alive through contemporary 
political discourse. For instance, Reagan's presidency was 
characterized by anti-Soviet discourse in which he professed 
that: "All the moral values this country cherishes . . . 
are fundamentally challenged by a powerful adversary which 
does not wish these values to survive."1712 Individuals 
assimilate this discourse producing an archetypal reserve of 
predispositions contrasting the United States persona Cgood] 
with the Soviet persona CbadD. 
The public relations campaign recontextualized the 
Strategic Defense Initiative by drawing from this reservoir 
of predispositions. The campaign triggered existing 
archetypal predispositions and attached them to the 
Strategic Defense Initiative by the descriptions of 
Reykjavik. The White House portrayal was of a menacing 
Soviet Union: They "worship at the altar of power," have 
"got nine thousand ballistic missile warheads that can 
strike the United States," have a "record of playing fast 
and loose with past agreements," "want to see how much 
farther they can push us in public," and had the intent of 
"killing S.D.I.'"73 
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The negative Soviet image was contrasted to the 
positive United States position. The initiative "would 
protect against cheating or the possibility of a madman 
sometime deciding to create nuclear missiles. After all, 
the world now knows how to make them."17" 
The Administration discourse suggested that S.D.I, must 
be 'good' since it was a creation of the U.S. Likewise the 
Soviet Union attempted to "kill" the initiative. The Soviet 
Union, "which is out to destroy the United States," would do 
all in its power to harm a policy instrument that is in the 
interest of the U.S., defense, and goes against the 
ostensible best interests of the U.S.S.R., world domination. 
The White House's public relations campaign intensified 
faith in these archetypal predispositions attached to the 
S.D.I, abstraction with other persuasive arguments stemming 
from the meetings. As stated earlier, the White House 
argued the Soviet intent for Reykjavik included propaganda 
purposes if their "design" to "kill S.D.I." failed. These 
allegations were in keeping with anti-Soviet 
predispositions. Assimilated discourse arguably has 
produced a popular sentiment that "CpDropaganda has become 
the most powerful single weapon in the communist arsenal. 
. . . It is utilized both to supplement military, 
conspiratorial, political, diplomatic, or economic measures. 
. . . It is the object of these schemers to raise doubt in 
the minds of our misinformed citizens."175 
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White House arguments were consistent with this 
instilled anti-Soviet predisposition. The public relations 
campaign presented its accounts as "true statements which 
are not very friendly to the U.S.S.R." Contradictory Soviet 
versions were suggested to be attempts to distort.176 
Also, accounts stressing presidential actions during 
the negotiating process strengthened the U.S. vs. Soviet 
archetypes. As noted above, the Office of the President has 
the benefit of non-constitutional roles. As Clinton 
Rossiter writes, the President is "the one-man distillation" 
of America.177 In the aftermath of Reykjavik, Reagan was 
portrayed as protector of the people. The Soviets were 
pitted against someone "who would judge the interests of the 
United States and hold firm for them" and was "capable of 
saying 'no.'"178 Revered qualities of the President — 
'constructive,' 'creative,' 'amenable yet resolved,' and 
'pragmatic'—espoused during the campaign were American 
attributes.17' Reagan's negotiation stance and his refusal 
to give up the Strategic Defense Initiative made it 
synonymous with a determined American objective of national 
defense. 
The result of this discourse supported the initial 
contextualization of S.D.I. This contextualization was 
a first order semiological relationship of signifier Soviet 
vs. American intent—to signified—the S.D.I, abstraction. 
In the aftermath of Reykjavik, S.D.I became a more value-
131 
weighted abstraction, a defensive instrument of a 'good' 
country, protecting itself from the aggressions of a 'bad' 
country. 
The worth of this contextualization was its ideographic 
rhetoricity as a coalition formulation device. S.D.I, had 
the potential for persuading individuals to affiliate with 
groups that believe defense to be an overriding U.S. 
interest. The initiative was used by the Administration in 
such a way to benefit the Republicans in the 1986 November 
congressional elections. The White House discursively used 
the item to revive the charge that Democrats critical of the 
initiative were "soft on defense."180 
This contextualization, however, had limited 
applications for convincing the majority of citizens that 
the outcome of Reykjavik was successful. The efficacy of 
the initiative was restricted to its being a defensive 
instrument. S.D.I was in the development phase. The 
initiative was only practical "for long-run insurance"—a 
future defense system with no utility for the present.181 
A convincing argument still could have been made that 
the Administration sacrificed a 'bird in the hand for one in 
the bush.' Perceived Soviet-American tensions had not been 
abated, and concrete proposals that could have eased them 
had been rejected. Such objections had the potential of 
adversely impacting S.D.I, and the perception of Reykjavik 
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because no mutual collective agreement exists concerning 
U.S. foreign policy. 
Citizens have only a framework of appropriate U.S. 
actions based on their perceptions of interests fundamental 
for the survival of the American vision. Individuals are 
socialized into a tripartite intuition of American interests 
which includes economic, defense and world order dimensions. 
These 'feelings' are vague conceptualizations of what is 
important to foreign policy. Unless a 'real' crisis occurs 
that immediately impacts on one certain dimension Can Oil 
embargo (economic) or a hostile attack or takeover of a U.S. 
installation (defense)1, American citizens presumably will 
direct their attention arbitrarily toward one of the three 
interests. 
In the case of Reykjavik and S.D.I., no actual crisis 
had taken place. Opponents could have aroused a majority of 
citizens with their arguments concerning the economic 
(astronomical cost), world order (destabilizing factor), as 
well as defense (deployment feasibility) ramifications 
over-shadowing White House arguments. If S.D.I had remained 
solely contextualized as a futuristic defense agenda item, 
these opposing arguments could have thwarted Administration 
attempts at redefining Reykjavik and retaining the Strategic 
Defense Initiative. 
For S.D.I, to be useful as more than an ideograph but 
as a suasory device for constructing popular opinion, it had 
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to take on a more extensive metaphoric meaning for American 
foreign policy. The image of S.D.I had to be moved from a 
position having bearing only on a future defense interest 
with no real immediate persuasive worth to one encompassing 
all three goal areas. In this state, S.D.I would be 
vindicated as a vision essential for the present and would 
have a suasory impact on popular opinion against potential 
arguments leveled against White House actions at Reykjavik. 
The Administration's public relations campaign was able 
to construct popular opinion by using synnationalistic 
rhetoric. This discourse was effective because: 1) it 
united the economic, world order, and defense interests in 
the context of Reykjavik to construct the concept of the 
American mission; and 2) it used the archetypal fueled form 
of S.D.I, to signify this concept. The result was a 
recontextualization of S.D.I, to a second semiological 
level. The initiative, recontextualized, signified what the 
mass holds to be important for U.S. foreign policy. 
First, the three interests were combined constructing 
the American mission as the underlying concept for the 
Iceland meetings. The American mission, as discussed in 
Chapter II, is a hermeneutic that serves as a basis for 
convincing citizens the appropriateness of U.S. foreign 
policy actions. This framework dictates that the United 
States should protect and promote the U.S. vision by seeking 
to convert other nation-states from their doctrines to that 
13^ 
of a constitutional federal republic modeled after the 
American system. 
The Administration successfully employed this concept 
throughout the Reagan era to defend its foreign policy. For 
instance, in his 1983 "State of the Union Address," Reagan 
argued that the U.S. "leadership role in the world came to 
us because of . . . the values which guide us as a free 
society. "18E Reagan professed that this "bedrock" provided 
the "cornerstone of a comprehensive strategy" that his 
Administration "intendCedD to pursue . . . vigorously." 
This international "stewardship of peace and freedom" 
combined the three interests in that the Administration 
argued its "strategy for peace with freedom Cworld order]" 
had to be "based on strength—economic and military 
strength.'"" 
As in the 1983 address, the White House public 
relations campaign used the American mission to explain the 
Reykjavik meetings. The campaign explicated the meetings as 
necessary for "pursuit of . . . [the] ideal toward a world 
where peace reigns and freedom is enshrined."18* This 
objective according to Reagan was one that America had been 
"honored by history, entrusted by destiny with the oldest 
dream of humanity"—the dream of lasting peace and human 
freedom."185 Seemingly, Reagan was not solely advocating the 
absence of war and extolling the merit of human autonomy. 
Instead, he was connoting what U.S. citizens apparently 
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consider to be the foreign policy goal of the United States-
—the "extension of freedom . . . Lai commitment to the 
growth of democratic government and democratic institutions 
around the world."184 
Second, the campaign recontextualized S.D.I, with the 
concept. Reagan argued that the pursuit of the mission had 
led to the initiative that had "most spurred the Soviets to 
negotiate seriously" at Reykjavik.107 In this 
synnationalistic context, S.D.I, with its archetypal charge 
suggestibly became a " 1 iteralization" of the American 
mission.'8" 
The White House recontextualized S.D.I, as a 
1iteralization of the American mission by using metaphoric 
discourse to identify S.D.I, to the three U.S. interests. 
For instance, the Administration's campaign joined S.D.I, 
and the economic interest through its discourse used in the 
portrayal of presidential actions at the meetings. The 
Reagan persona took on that of a shrewd 'capitalist' against 
the Soviets who were diametrically opposed to that 
principle. 
The descriptions of Reagan conceivably had semblance to 
the average citizen's conception of the U.S. economic 
system. The simplest form of this system according to 
Milton Friedman is "freedom of exchange."'" This system 
ingrained within American folklore rests on the principles 
of "law and order"190 that "gives people what they want 
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instead of what a particular group thinks they ought to 
want.""1 
The public relations campaign suggested that Reagan was 
skillfully using this most basic meaning of capitalism. 
According to Shultz, Reagan was willing to negotiate for 
those "things that were potentially important to the United 
States and our allies," but he refused to "give the store 
CS.D.I.3 away. . . . CWDhen he saw something that he felt 
was not in the interest of the United States, he had the 
courage to say 'No.' "It was time to walk away from it.""s 
Through the Administration's use of this discourse, the 
Strategic Defense Initiative was recontextualized as a 
metaphor for combined United States interests, a 
1iteralization of the American mission. As in the above 
example, S.D.I, was a non-negotiable commodity that Reagan 
was justified in refusing to give up because of its 
defensive and world order benefits. As Reagan explained, 
"There was no way I could tell our people their government 
would not protect them against nuclear destruction. I went 
to Reykjavik determined that everything was negotiable 
except two things our freedom and our future."193 
Without the benefit of metaphoric discourse, S.D.I.'s 
recontextualization, as Robert L. Ivie argues, would be 
difficult or impossible.19* The discourse provided S.D.I, 
with the "appearance of sheer rationality" that "compensated 
for lingering doubts over any such ambiguities" as the 
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initiative's cost or even its existence. The initiative 
"emerged as a rigid, probative line of reasoning which 
presumed to test independently the very metaphor from which 
its own premises were drawn."195 On one hand, S.D.I, did 
exist since the Soviets rejected Reagan's proposals due to 
the Strategic Defense Initiative. The device was viable, or 
why would a militaristic government place demands on it? 
Why would they enter into negotiations in which historic 
breakthroughs became a possibility, if S.D.I, were not 
crucial? And yet, the form of S.D.I, did not demand 
substance. Shultz stated that the potential agreements that 
defined success for Reykjavik were possible "no doubt in 
large part because the President has insisted on learning 
about strategic defense."196 
The campaign enhanced the rhetoricity of the S.D.I, 
recontextualization by drawing from other situations. In 
one case, a "goading symbol of American failure dealing with 
Russians" was coupled with the more recent Administration 
examples of Soviet actions to justify S.D.I.197 White House 
Communications Director Buchanan constructed an argument 
suggesting that if Franklin Roosevelt had "been as tough at 
Yalta as Ronald Reagan was at Reykjavik," the United States 
"might not have had some of the problems that we've got 
today."198 By referring to Yalta, the Administration drew 
from a historic American experience of a negotiating session 
that, unlike Reykjavik, had been "greeted with almost 
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unanimous praise." However, the Soviets made "flagrant 
violations" of the Yalta provisions and "seemed to speak 
contempt for the whole idea of world peace." The initial 
hope that the Yalta Conference would bring better Soviet-
American relations and understanding decayed.199 
The campaign recycled the meaning internalized from 
this historic example. The Administration alleged the 
Soviets had violated the existing 197S ABM Treaty and the 
1975 Helsinki Accords and had been involved in world-wide 
regional conflicts.600 These professed situations reinforced 
the Soviet vs. American archetypal predisposition that the 
U.S.S.R. had not changed drastically from their 1945 
posture, fortifying a long held U.S. attitude that the 
Soviet "talk much about peace but feverishly prepare for 
war."801 As Buchanan asserted: "This gets down to the 
question. Do you feel that Mr. Gorbachev and the Soviet 
Union are more interested in genuine peace and getting rid 
of weapons than Ronald Reagan?"E0E 
In this context, S.D.I literalized a determined moral 
America fighting for its vision against an equally 
determined morally corrupt Soviet Union. Upholding S.D.I, 
made the initiative symbolic of a U.S. triumph or as 
Buchanan argued, "Reagan's 'finest hour.'"803 
Besides using situations to intensify the rhetoricity 
of S.D.I., the White House campaign used the symbolic power 
of the presidency to generate additional credibility. The 
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Administration argued that the office placed Reagan's 
judgments beyond reproach. As Buchanan maintained, "even if 
the American people disagree with the President, he was 
elected to do what's right."80* Campaign spokespersons 
argued that S.D.I, was an extension of the presidency whose 
"function is to defend the national security interest. "eoa 
By recontextualizing S.D.I, as a 1iteralization of the 
American mission and enhancing the metaphor through 
situation and presidential role, the initiative became more 
effective for constructing a favorable popular opinion than 
its 'defense' rhetoricity. Without verifiable substance to 
its form, arguments against the initiative lost their force. 
Three such arguments were: 1) The initiative demonstrated a 
U.S. aggressive intent; 2) S.D.I, demanded a huge projected 
cost; and 3) S.D.I was not technologically plausible. 
First, opponents argued that the Strategic Defense 
Initiative was a destabilizing device. Robert McNamara 
observed this tendency occurred because "CtUhere is deep 
mistrust on each side CAmerican and Soviet]. Each side 
. . . fears the other side is seeking to achieve a first 
strike capability. . . . CT3he steps we take—the actions 
we engage in—lead the Soviets to that belief."*06 
The public relations campaign overcame this argument by 
pointing out the Soviet Union had "devoted far more 
resources, for a lot longer time than we, to their own 
'S.D.I.'"607 The United States "had not bothered" with an 
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anti-ballistic missile system since "the threat of 
nationwide annihilation made such limited defense seem 
useless.""8 The Administration incorporated S.D.I within 
its agenda only after it determined the program of "mutual 
destruction and slaughter" of Soviet and American citizens 
"uncivilized."609 From the White House's perspective, having 
no shield meant the "slaughter of a bunch of Russians. a,° 
The difference between the two systems was that the 
Soviet vs. American archetypes attached to S.D.I, made the 
perception of the 'operational' Soviet system militaristic 
and the envisioned U.S. plan altruistic. S.D.I.'s form 
allowed one state's proven offense to become another 
nation's defense. 
Reagan manifested the disparate intents. He told the 
American people "if and when we reached the stage of testing 
we would sign now a treaty that would permit Soviet 
observation of such tests. And if the program was practical 
we would both eliminate our offensive missiles, and then we 
would share the benefits of advanced defenses."611 
S.D.I.'s rhetoricity became more compelling in the 
context of Reykjavik. A Pentagon spokesman contrasted the 
importance of the U.S. system with the Soviet program at the 
meetings in which the Soviets attempted to maintain a 
"balance in the balance of terror" while S.D.I, offered 
"protection" for both countries "instead of blowing each 
other up. "E1E The Soviet refusal of U.S. proposals because 
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of linkage to S.D.I, tended to confirm the White House's 
argument of a "critical moral distinction between 
totalitarianism and democracy.""3 
A second objection raised against the Strategic Defense 
Initiative was the enormous cost of the program that was 
estimated in the trillions of dollars. The White House 
campaign used the synnationalistic recontextualization of 
S.D.I, to shift the focus of the argument from cost to 
benefits. As a 1iteralization of the American mission, 
S.D.I.'s objective was to protect the futuristic projection 
of the U.S. vision on the international community. 
By transferring the locus of the argument, financing 
for the program seemed reasonable. The answer to the charge 
of S.D.I.'s high cost was not in terms of dollar amounts. 
Instead, the Administration argued, "America can't afford to 
take a chance."21* Reagan contended that "America and the 
West need S.D.I, for long-run insurance. It protects 
against the possibility that at some point when the 
elimination of ballistic missiles is not yet complete the 
Soviets may change their mind. We know the Soviet record of 
playing fast and loose with past agreements.""' 
S.D.I, 's recontextualization suggested a more noble 
purpose than solely a U.S. defense interest. The policy 
item limited to an instrument of defense could be challenged 
because of massive funding. Likewise, Administration 
actions at Iceland could be disputed due to these cost and 
14E 
the viability of the item at that time. But the campaign's 
recontextualization of S.D.I, as integral to the American 
mission justified spending for a future world interest, an 
'insurance policy' for the world. 
Comparably, justification for the initiative's 
feasibility was constructed by the recontextualized meaning 
of S.D.I that broadened its definitional base beyond that of 
a defensive weapon. The Administration recycled what 
Zagacki and King contend were S.D.I.'s originating "romantic 
themes" of American culture, preservations of American 
traditions.614 By directing definitional focus away from 
weapons technology, the Strategic Defense Initiative became 
a sign for American beneficence and "material prosper i ty. "El7 
Furthermore, S.D.I, stood for the benefits of American 
ingenuity. The campaign recycled the Reagan argument, 
suggested by Janice Hocker Rushing, the possibility of an 
"Edenic past" derived from a "scientific future. "E1B This 
recontextualized meaning of S.D.I., however, did not limit 
the initiative's advantages to the United States polity but 
suggested world progress through S.D.I. The initiative 
would not destroy, but American technological supremacy and 
creativity would be a vehicle for fulfilling the American 
mission. Questions concerning its viability as those 
opposing Kennedy's challenge of "going to the moon," would 
prevent the U.S. from "getting there."6" 
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S.D.I.'s recontextualization worked effectively, 
outweighing any likely opposition because the campaign 
suggested a sense of participation on the part of the 
American people. Administration strategies for 
recontextualizing S.D.I, recycled the myth that people are 
collaborators in the nation-state vision. The U.S. citizens 
were ultimately responsible for the success of the American 
mission under the guidance of the President. Reagan told 
the American people, " . . . I have always regarded you, the 
American people, as full participants. Believe me, without 
your support, none of these talks could have been held, nor 
could the ultimate aims of American foreign policy—world 
peace and freedom—be pursued: 
Your energy has restored and expanded our economic 
might; your support has restored our military 
strength. Your courage and sense of national 
unity in times of crisis have given pause to our 
adversaries, heartened our friends, and inspired 
the world. The Western democracies and the NATO 
alliance are revitalized and all across the world 
nations are turning to democratic ideas and the 
principles of the free market. So because the 
American people stood guard at the critical hour, 
freedom has gathered its forces, regained its 
strength, and is on the march."0 
The concept of Reykjavik, the American mission, was 
fundamental to this strategy. As argued by the 
Administration, S.D.I., as a recontextualization, was 
necessary for the eventual fruition of the mission. 
According to the Administration, the only way that the 
144 
"dream" could be realized was for American popular opinion 
to "maintain . . . determination and . . . direction"—to 
continue to support the Strategic Defense Initiative."' 
The democratizing of the world would take time. Of 
course, America had to survive for the future democratizing 
process. But in the meantime, popular support would 
demonstrate through example to the existing democracies and 
other nations the virtues of the American form of 
government. 
Furthermore, American popular opinion would bring the 
Soviets back to negotiations because at Reykjavik, as Reagan 
contended, "it was this strength and unity that brought the 
Soviets to the bargaining table. And particularly important 
was America's support for the Strategic Defense 
Ini t iat i ve . "E2E Eventually Soviet conversion might occur for 
as General Graham posited, "CIDt's already got the Soviets 
realizing that if these defenses go in masses of nuclear 
weapons are not the answer to their problems.""3 Thus as 
long as S.D.I, was accepted by the American people, the 
concept would be attainable. 
Arguably, the result of the White House public 
relations campaign was the creation of a rhetorical icon 
from the Strategic Defense Initiative. As the New York 
Times/CBS News Poll indicated the campaign produced "perhaps 
stronger, confidence in the . . . plan."ee* The reason for 
this increased popular confidence in the initiative was that 
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its meaning became central to American myths. Primarily, 
the initiative was envisioned as a defensive system, 
however, the campaign recontextualized S.D.I, to embrace 
other interests constructing the American mission. Popular 
acceptance of those interests demanded devotion to the 
recontextualization. In effect, the initiative provided an 
immortality symbol for the people. With its existence came 
a promise that the U.S. nation-state could continue to 
prosper unthreatened, eventually leading to a world politic 
commensurate with the American ideal. 
Summary 
This analysis of Reagan Administration discourse may 
provide insights into the workings of U.S. foreign policy 
legitimation. The popular verdict for the failed Reykjavik 
meetings was a measure of the Administration's success in 
recontextualizing the Strategic Defense Initiative. The 
Reagan Administration's rejection of Soviet proposals had 
come to be seen as saving S.D.I. 
The Administration was able to construct popular 
opinion by recontextualizing S.D.I, as a guardian and 
guarentor of the American mission. Thus, when demands were 
placed on the initiative at Reykjavik, citizens were 
persuaded to support the Administration's rejection of those 
demands. 
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By supporting S.D.I.'s recontextualization, the 
citizens were provided with a sense that they were active 
participants in the destiny.of the American nation-state. 
The sense of 'participation' strengthened the legitimacy of 
the foreign policy establishment. Governmental actions at 
Reykjavik were sanctified and the governmental agenda was 
strengthened. The ramifications of this analysis are 
discussed in the concluding chapter 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
This study concludes with a summary and discussion of 
the implications, and suggestions for future research. In 
the first section, the findings of the study are summarized 
to show how U.S. foreign policy discourse restricts debate 
and limits participation of the citizens. The argument is 
made that this discourse subverts both traditional American 
ideals and the deepest rhetorical traditions of civic 
humanism. In the final section, the limitations of the 
study are suggested. Potential areas of research are 
outlined that could strengthen the value and test the 
usefulness of the model this study proposes. 
I 
Summary and Implications 
Authority in U.S. foreign policy tends to be 
centralized within a foreign policy establishment. Several 
assumptions support this arrangement. First, debate is 
assumed to be detrimental to U.S international operations. 
Foreign policy operates under the assumption that the policy 
is linked to the state's sovereignty and its vision. 
Foreign policy is the expression of United States 
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competition with other nation-states for the advancement of 
its national security interests. In this environment, 
oftencharacterized as a situation demanding secrecy and 
urgency, debate is deemed counterproductive. 
Second, citizens are thought to be incapable of 
participating in the decision making process. Although 
majority support is required for foreign policy, individuals 
within the United States are regarded as being wedded to 
'privatism,' an orientation "toward personal concerns, 
including the desire to improve material well-being."1 This 
assumed orientation suggests that citizens are unwilling to 
spend the time to gain information by which to determine 
appropriate policy actions. Finally, it is assumed that 
foreign policy is best left to experts who can mediate its 
complexity in terms that ordinary people can grasp. 
This study argues that policy advocates use 
synnationalistic discourse to overcome these presumptions. 
Such discourse is used to solidify majority approval for 
foreign policy actions. Synnationalistic discourse 
recontextualizes agenda items as 1iteralizations of the more 
pervasive goal of U.S. interests assimilated by citizens, 
the American mission. This mission holds the U.S. vision as 
the paragon for the international community. The items, 
synnationalistically contextualized, evoke an image of an 
omnipotent United States from the citizens. 
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With synnationalistic meaning, foreign policy items 
take on a rhetoricity similar to that of 'condensation' or 
'key terms.' The foreign policy items become 
recontextualized symbols of the enduring American mission 
—rhetorical icons. These items are effective in 
constructing popular opinion and serve as a means for 
decisions to remain centralized and for defusing potential 
debate. 
The primary implication of this study is that the 
discursive process of American foreign policy impairs the 
rhetorical tradition and a U.S. axiom. First, the 
traditional foundation of rhetoric has been the rejection of 
an absolute truth and a reliance on probability in decision 
making. Seorge Kennedy asserts, rhetoric is only "useful 
and legitimate" when two sides are presented and "the choice 
between them can be clearly perceived and intelligently 
made. "e 
Second, the United States as a nation-state system has 
as a founding principle that people have a stake in their 
political destinies. The U.S. is an institution created by 
and for its people. It does not vest permanent authority in 
'great men' or in special groups of persons. Ultimately, 
the citizens are responsible for its operations. 
Synnationalistic discourse harms both ideals. First, 
this discourse removes choice, the "contestable validity 
claims," from agenda items.3 Support for foreign policy 
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items are not determined by "good arguments"—"a worthiness 
to be recognized."* Instead, advocates interface items with 
the American vision to construct popular confidence in their 
foreign policy items. 
The rhetorical potency for these agenda items, such as 
S.D.I., is grounded in their tendency to be immune from 
counter-arguments. To deny these instruments means that 
citizens, in effect, deny the U.S. vision. Conversely, if 
supportive, the people, as Representative Jack Kemp said of 
those who favored S.D.I., sre on "high moral and political 
ground . "s 
Second, the discourse tends to diminish citizen input 
to the foreign policy process. The discourse creates a 
"bridge" that suggests to the citizen that his/her interests 
are identical with those of the state.6 Over time, mere 
passive assent becomes an acceptable substitue for active 
participation.7 
The outcome, as Havel argues, is an "illusion" that 
conceals citizens "adaptation to the status quo."8 The 
people acquiesce to the foreign policy establishment 
reacting to its decisions rather than actively engaging in 
decision making. The individual is freed to pursue his/her 
private ventures knowing that the establishment's decisions 
are the 'right' ones. Instead of having the potential for 
being an actor, though minor, in the process, the citizen is 
relegated to being an observer. 
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For the discursive process to be consistent with the 
ideals of rhetoric and the U.S. nation-state, foreign policy 
discourse should induce 'true' public participation in the 
decision making of the state. The public, as Gerald A. 
Hauser describes, is "participating, judging—in a dynamic 
sense—persons who are actively involved in shaping the ways 
social wheels turn."9 The public "is active and creative" 
that "weighs and exchanges."0 
To achieve this aim, discourse would not be designed 
for popular acquiescence. Instead, the discourse would be a 
means of advocacy presenting one view while allowing for 
alternatives. The excusatory function would be removed, 
reminding citizens of their participatory responsibilities 
in U.S. decisions. This goal may be impossible to 
accomplish. But, the insights from this and other studies 
describing U.S. foreign policy discourse as it is currently 
used may move discourse in that direction. 
Current changes in the international community may 
challenge the specific dimensions of this model since 
societal institutions and their presumptions are fragile and 
are in constant flux. However, the broader assumption on 
which this model is based, the synnationalistic tendency of 
foreign policy discourse, should have continued 
applicability. For this model to be comprehensive as a 
means for analyzing foreign policy discourse, certain 
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limitations need to be addressed. These limitations are 
suggested in the next section. 
II 
Suggestions for Future Research 
This approach for the analysis of U.S. foreign policy 
discourse is admittedly incomplete for three reasons. These 
limitations need to be addressed to improve the model as 
well as to test its usefulness. First, this study is based 
on a single extended example. The model is operationalized 
using the Strategic Defense Initiative in conjunction with 
the 1986 Reykjavik meetings. This model of synnationalistic 
discourse needs to be tested in the contexts of other 
foreign policy items. These applications could include not 
only items that the United States proposes in its 
relationship with the U.S.S.R. but for its dealings with 
allies and nonaligned third world countries. 
Second, this study assumes the primacy of discourse. 
For purposes of scope, this study does not address the 
influence of media on the passivity of the U.S. citizenry. 
Also, the study does not analyze the impacts of the media on 
popular opinion. 
Future research could explore these areas. Studies 
might investigate the media's pacifying effects on U.S. 
citizens by their coverage of U.S. foreign policy. Another 
area of inquiry could focus on roles of various media in the 
construction of popular opinion. Finally, research might 
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extend the exploration of the extent to which the foreign 
policy establishment controls the media. These studies may 
make this model of discourse analysis more comprehensive by 
expanding it to a mass mediated construct. 
A final limitation of this study is the perspective 
from which it is written. This study analyzes U.S. foreign 
policy discourse in the context of a bipolar world. The 
model focuses on the U ."5̂  foreign policy establishment's 
continued reliance on the nation-state vision as it is 
constructed in an environment of competition between two 
world 'powers,' the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. 
Future studies could apply this model to what is 
perhaps an evolving multipolar international community. 
These studies could explore what changes might occur in 
foreign policy discourse if the basic assumptions that 
undergird its rhetoric change. For instance, studies might 
address the potential importance that economics may come to 
have on foreign policy discourse. These studies could 
examine competing discourse between multinational 
corporations, regional, and ethnic groups pursing their 
interests and the foreign policy establishment holding to 
the existing nation-state vision as each attempts to 
construct popular opinion. 
Besides these suggestions for future research, an 
additional area of potential investigation exists. Attempts 
could be made to isolate existing icons within U.S. foreign 
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policy. Studies of this nature might lead to a hierarchical 
inventory of icons. 
The research might explore the possibility that some 
icons are peripheral while others are pivotal. Some icons 
may be minor recontextualizations that can be broken without 
any lasting impacts on popular opinion. Others may be 
crucial 1iteralizations of American values, leaving little 
room for modification. 
These studies may show how the foreign policy 
establishment is able, at times, to violate the rhetoricity 
of existing icons. Also, the studies might explain why 
foreign policy establishments may become victims to their 
own rhetorical creations. The result of these studies may 
eventually lead to foreign policy discourse that is designed 
to increase citizen participation in the process. 
This chapter has argued that U.S. foreign discourse 
should encourage public participation in the decision making 
of the state. This ideal is opposed to the discourse as it 
is currently practiced. Toward that end, the model of 
discourse this project proposes attempts to show how the 
foreign policy establishment is able to centralize authority 
and limit participation. 
This chapter also has suggested areas of research that 
may strengthen and test the applications of this model. 
These descriptive investigations may reveal the 
imperfections of foreign policy discourse. These analyses 
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might enable the rhetorical scholar to prescribe 
improvements. Through continuing research of this nature, 
legitimate foreign policy discourse eventually may emerge 
that directly involves citizens in the decision making 
process of the state. 
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